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ABSTRACT 
Robust communications are key to the success of naval operations such as area 
surveillance, control, and interdiction. Communication and sensor networks allow the 
flow of data and critical information that is necessary for conducting an operation from 
both the tactical and strategic perspectives. In naval operations, the platforms are hardly 
stationary, as the networking infrastructure operates from a variety of platforms in motion 
on the sea, above the sea, and from space, in the case of satellite support.  
Sensor networks consist of nodes made up of small sensors that are able to 
monitor, process, and analyze phenomena over geographical regions of varying sizes and 
for significant periods. Some categories of these small, and sometimes low-cost, sensors 
are able to collect and transmit, or relay, sensor data about physical values (e.g., 
temperature, humidity, and sea state), or dynamic attributes of objects, such as speed, 
direction, and the existence of dangerous substances (e.g., radioactive materials, 
explosives).  
The objective of this thesis is to examine how unstructured sensor networks, 
known also as ad-hoc sensor networks, can effectively support maritime interdiction 
operations and regional security by providing reliable communications and flow of 
information. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION 
Since the beginning of this century’s sudden outburst of international terrorism, 
the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been involved in a 
concerted effort to eradicate all aspects of terrorism. Several countries (e.g., the United 
States of America [USA] and the United Kingdom [UK]) are working hard to thwart all 
aspects of terrorism, including those that threaten the free and safe movement and 
distribution of goods over the seas. Addressing these maritime challenges requires a large 
commitment of resources because of the vastness of the seaways, which remain a critical 
element in militaries’ lines of communication and businesses’ efficient flow of 
commerce. Related to the terrorism challenge is piracy. There are some areas in the world 
where pirate activity remains common (e.g., the Indian Ocean east of the Horn of Africa, 
the South Coast of Nigeria, and the Strait of Malacca); hence, there are several ongoing, 
coordinated anti-piracy naval operations. In many ways, the term Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO) applies well to these efforts to thwart terrorism and piracy on the 
world’s seaways.    
B. MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS (MIO) 
A Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) is a naval operation that makes use of 
coercive measures to delay, disrupt, or even destroy enemy forces or provisions on the 
way to an area of interest—which can be a battle area or an area that represents a 
potential threat environment—before the enemy does any damage against friendly forces 
[1], [2]. According to the NATO’s operational document for MIO [3], “a Maritime 
Interdiction Operation (MIO) encompasses seaborne enforcement measures to intercept 
the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specific area. 
MIOs are normally restricted to the interception and, if necessary, boarding of vessels to 
verify, redirect or impound their cargoes in support of the enforcement of economic or 
military sanctions.”  
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As long as commerce has traveled across the world’s waterways, piracy has been 
a challenge. Today, some parties, whether countries, small segments of society (e.g., the 
militia in Somalia), or individual crews refuse to comply with international law and 
threaten security and peace, not only in a particular region, but, in some circumstances, 
on a worldwide scale. Confirming that these countries or parties are violating 
international law or international mandates (e.g., United Nations [UN] resolutions) or 
enforcing sanctions or embargoes may require a complex set of maritime operations. 
Sanctions may include constraining or denying of supplies or other trading privileges, 
and even the liberty of moving people out of a particular area. The military objective of a 
sanction is to impose a selective barrier to control or prevent the traffic of products, 
persons, or services to or from a particular area. Usually the enforcement of a sanction 
requires support by a combination of military operations by air, land, and sea. Naval 
forces usually conduct MIOs during sanction enforcement by attempting to reduce the 
flow of prohibited items and prevent potential enemy actions in the area of interest. 
Various factors such as the environment, maritime assets, personnel, the sophistication of 
the adversary, and logistics affect, positively or negatively, the MIO objective [3]. 
While an embargo can be established by a country unilaterally, usually it is the 
United Nations that authorizes the use of such force with a UN Security Council 
resolution. Apart from the authorization of the UN, a county can use national assets (e.g., 
ships and planes) to impose an embargo in order to defend against a threat to peace and 
security as defined by international law [3].  
MIO assets normally are eligible to execute the following actions: 
• Vessel interrogation for various reasons that do not have to do with 
navigation safety. 
• Documentation and cargo examination. 
• Boarding (i.e., embarking an armed party to conduct searches of a vessel). 
• Diverting of vessels that refuse to comply with the sanctioning force’s 
directions. 
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• Seizure of vessels and their cargo if they do not divert as ordered by 
sanctioning forces [3]. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Armed boarding parties conducting MIO (Images from militaryphotos.net 
and wikimedeia.org). 
MIOs are an integral part of antiterrorism and anti-piracy operations. MIOs also 
contribute to short-term and long-term regional security, since they result in the control of 
all maritime traffic. Additionally, MIOs are used to detain illegal or dangerous cargo 
transported by ships and to prevent illegal immigration. The transportation of illegal 
immigrants by vessels from one region to another concerns many nations. Several 
seaways are used for this illegal activity (e.g., the Mediterranean Sea is a human-
smuggling route from Africa and the Middle East to Europe, and the Persian Gulf and 
Arabian Sea is used as a route from the coasts of Iran and Pakistan to the Arabian 
Peninsula). It is easily understood that effective surveillance of the seas and execution of 
MIOs is necessary to significantly constrain these phenomena.  
Over the past decade, maritime operations have changed considerably, due to the 
desire to counter asymmetric threats. These asymmetric threats can be weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), radioactive and biologically hazardous material, improvised, 
explosive devices (IEDs), etc., that can be used during a terrorist attack and, despite their 
usually insignificant dimensions, can cause disproportionate catastrophe and death. The 
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threat of these small and lethal weapons requires naval forces to adjust operations quickly 
and effectively to prevent devastating attacks. An aspect of this adjustment is the rapid 
development and use of reliable sensors and communications networks in austere 
environments to enhance friendly forces’ ability to detect and interdict these threats while 
they remain in a remote area (i.e., offshore ). Consequently, the means (e.g., 
communication and networking systems, sensors) to facilitate the execution of MIO and 
regional security operations have to be evolved.  
C.  AD-HOC SENSOR NETWORKS IN MIO: BACKGROUND 
Unambiguous, robust communications are vital to the success of naval operations 
such as area surveillance, control, and interdiction. Communications and sensor networks 
allow the flow of data and critical information that is necessary for the conduct of an 
operation from both tactical and strategic perspectives. Sensor network communications 
are affected by several factors, such as the physical environment, network-systems 
quality, asset positioning, and the electromagnetic environment. Conventional wireless 
networks have stationary networking infrastructure such as base stations (e.g., buildings 
and antennas) serving as gathering nodes for traffic emanating from mobile devices. 
These nodes interact with the base stations in a client/server fashion. When considering 
naval operations, the situation becomes more complicated: the platforms are hardly 
stationary, as the networking infrastructure operates from a variety of platforms in motion 
on the sea, above the sea, and from space, in the case of satellite support [4]. Thus, the 
objective of this thesis is to examine how unstructured networks are able to effectively 
communicate in naval operations despite the low coverage of their antennas. Such 
systems are known as sensor networks or ad-hoc networks. 
Sensor networks consist of nodes made up of small sensors that are able to 
monitor, process, and analyze phenomena over geographical regions of varying sizes and 
for significant periods. Recent progress in sensor-network technology has led to the 
invention of small, low-cost sensors that are able to collect and transmit, or relay, sensor 
data about physical values (e.g., temperature, humidity, and sea state), or dynamic 
attributes of objects (e.g., speed and direction of movement), and the existence or absence 
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of substances (e.g., radioactive materials and explosives). These capabilities are useful 
applications in a number of other maritime operations (e.g., habitat and environment 
monitoring, healthcare, and military surveillance) [4]. As mentioned by Hans-Joachim 
Hof [5], the application of a sensor network customarily determines not only the sensor 
nodes’ design, but also the design of the particular network comprising those nodes. 
Surveillance is the primary aim of sensor networks used by the military. The 
purpose of surveillance missions is to collect or verify as much data as possible 
concerning the enemy’s capabilities, positions, and intentions in order to have a detailed 
tactical overview, along with data about the area of operations. Since manned 
surveillance missions in forward-deployed areas often involve high risk for friendly 
forces, the assets assigned to the missions require a high degree of stealth and protection. 
With advances in sensor networks, many surveillance missions can be achieved with less 
risk; consequently, the deployment of unmanned surveillance missions, by exploiting 
wireless sensor networks, is crucial for military and other security-related missions. 
Nowadays, threats vary from bands and organized groups to unmanned vehicles able to 
operate above, on, and even below the sea surface. Combining the aforementioned 
situation with the potential of asymmetric threats such as radiological, biological, or 
chemical agents makes for a difficult security challenge. 
Previous research examined the feasibility and constraints of applying modern 
sensor-networking technology on Aegean islands. The concept espoused providing 
information to the Hellenic Coast Guard to enhance situational awareness and decision-
making capability [7]. This research was limited to an island-based network topology. In 
MIO, most sensors are employed on assets moving and operating on the sea surface, or in 
the air, in the case of unmanned, aerial vehicles (UAVs). Those dynamic conditions 
hinder reliable connection (i.e., cause range changes among nodes, or interference of 
physical obstacles between two network nodes) or even interrupt reliable connection 
among the sensor nodes of the MIO network and require the adoption of methods to 
facilitate and maintain area coverage. A military wireless-network design is highly 
affected by signal-propagation phenomena. Many architectures are tested and utilized to 
ensure that alternative routing and handling of data address potential problems and 
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drawbacks beyond the standards acceptable in civilian ad-hoc networks. Currently, 
terrestrial node cannot reach far into open seas; therefore, an aerial platform (e.g., a 
UAV) or other relay platform (e.g., smart buoys) [8] are a low-cost solution when there is 
no coverage by a land-based network, or low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite coverage is 
inadequate or unavailable. 
D. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
This thesis investigates the use of ad-hoc sensor networks to support maritime 
interdiction operations in a broad coverage area (i.e., a 50-nautical-mile radius or more). 
Specifically it investigates the following: 
i) How can be ad-hoc networks be used to robustly support MIO? 
ii) What quality of service (QoS) and survivability advantages do ad-hoc 
networks provide to MIO?  
iii) What are the limitations of ad-hoc networks supporting MIO? 
This thesis develops a foundational understanding of how ad-hoc networks can 
effectively provide robust communications and flow of information during maritime 
interdiction operations. It also extrapolates on how these sensor networks potentially 
benefit other maritime operations. 
E. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter I includes introductory material 
regarding the motivation, scope, and background for this research. Chapter II summarizes 
the literature review for the concept of the ad-hoc sensor. Chapter III analyzes the 
operational concept of a MIO ad-hoc sensor network. Chapter IV discusses 
experimentations on MIO ad-hoc sensor networks and the lessons learned. Chapter V 
presents the conclusions and potential areas of future research on this particular subject. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless communication technologies are undergoing rapid advancements. Since 
the beginning of wireless networking, two categories of wireless networks have emerged: 
infrastructure networks (e.g., local-area networks (LANs) and wide-area networks 
(WANs)) and ad-hoc networks. “Ad-hoc” is a Latin expression meaning “for this 
purpose.” “Ad-hoc networks” is a term referring to networks created for a particular aim. 
These networks are created on the fly for temporary use, and occasionally for extended 
lifetime use, depending on their desired role. Usually, ad-hoc networks consist of several 
workstations (e.g., desktop and laptop computers) or other wireless devices (e.g., cell 
phones and tablet personal computers) able to establish communications with each other 
for information exchange [9].  
A wireless ad-hoc network is a decentralized type of network without a 
preexisting infrastructure (e.g., wired networks, routers, or access points) to support it, as 
in a managed (i.e., infrastructure) type of wireless network. Instead, each node is 
involved individually in data routing for the other nodes, resulting in a dynamic 
establishment of nodes that forward data according to the network’s connectivity. 
Additionally, ad-hoc networks are able to use flooding for data forwarding [10]. In the 
case of a limited or even non-existing network topology, flooding is the simplest form of 
information distribution through the network nodes [11]. Flooding in a network is the 
forwarding of data from a network node connected to a router to any other node 
connected to the router, except to the source node of this data [12]. Flooding is an 
algorithm that has application in several network scenarios, such as link-state 
advertisements in wireless multi-hop networks and query propagation in peer-to-peer 
networks [11].  
An ad-hoc network typically refers to any network where the status of all devices 
is equal and they are free to connect with any other ad-hoc network device in their 
effective link range. An ad-hoc network makes use of an 802.11 or 802.16 standard mode 
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of operation established by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)  
for worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX). IEEE 802.11 refers to 
wireless, local-area networks (WLAN) communications in 2.4, 3.6 and 5 GHz ranges, 
and typically supports  relatively short range wi-fi networks (e.g., home networks). The 
IEEE 802.16 standard refers to broadband, wireless, metropolitan-area networks 
(WMAN) in frequencies of 2–66 GHz and data rates of up to 100Mbps, in the case of a 
mobile nodes network. With the adoption of IEEE 802.16, the data transmitted by a node 
signal can reach distances of around 50 km (27 nautical miles) [13], [14], [15]. 
Wireless ad-hoc networks are classified by their application to the following 
categories [10], [16]: 
• Mobile  ad-hoc networks (MANET) 
• Wireless mesh networks (WMN) 
• Wireless sensor networks (WSN) 
An example of an ad-hoc network for military purposes is depicted in Figure 2. 
The network nodes depicted include ships, air and land vehicles, remote sensors, and 
personnel. They communicate with each other through the network thereby enhancing 
information exchange during dynamic operations. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Network for the conduct of military operations (Image from VirginiaTech 
ECE department website)  
 9 
B.  AD-HOC NETWORK CATEGORIES 
1. Mobile  Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) 
Mobile, ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are not hinged on centralized and regulated 
connectivity. Because of the rapid evolution of wireless communication systems, the 
deployment of independent mobile users, e.g., the establishment of resistant, efficient, 
reliable, dynamic communication for emergency and rescue operations, and of course 
military networks, is necessary. A MANET, according to the Advanced Network 
Technologies Division of National Institute of Standards and Technology, is defined as 
“an autonomous collection of mobile users that communicate over relatively bandwidth-
limited wireless links.” Due to the nodes’ mobility, especially during military operations, 
the network topology is rapidly altered through time in unforeseen ways. For example 
during a MIO, since the assets are typically mobile and afloat, the nodes change their 
location in the network for a variety of reasons, such as human decisions or 
environmental forces. MANETs are decentralized networks because all network activity, 
including topology discovery and message delivery, is individually conducted by each 
node. [16] 
A wide variety of networks embody the principles of a MANET such as small, 
static networks limited by energy sources, to large-scale, mobile, highly dynamic 
networks. For all applications, MANETs make use of algorithms for efficient 
determination of network organization, link scheduling, and information routing. In a 
MANET, many factors significantly affect the viability of routing paths and message 
delivery in decentralized environments such as variable wireless-link quality, 
propagation-path losses, attenuation, multiuser interference, alterations of topology, and 
other factors. In the case of military operations such as MIO, MANETs must also address 
additional constraints such as connectivity, available bandwidth, energy availability, 
scalability, and security. Factors like latency, reliability, potential jamming, and 
restoration from possible node malfunction significantly affect the network’s design and 
performance. The network adjusts to overcome these factors by altering its routing paths. 
The potential of a MANET network to expand and get denser, for example, during a 
boarding phase of a MIO operation where several nodes, such as the boarding team, 
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vessels, UAVs, or buoys may be present, may result in latency increase and continual 
node disconnection–reconnection. [16], [17] 
Military networks, such as networks for naval operations including MIO, are 
designed to operate in a way that ensures a low probability of intercept and/or a low 
probability of detection. Consequently, it is desirable for the nodes to radiate with the 
least possible power and reduce their frequency of transmission, depending always on 
operational needs, to decrease the probability of detection or interception. Any deviation 
in any of these requirements may lead to overall performance and credibility deterioration 
like interception of information flow through the network and potential malfunction of 
nodes that may lead to entire collapse of the network. [16]  
2. Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN) 
A wireless mesh network (WMN) is defined as a communications network 
consisting of radio nodes organized in a mesh topology. In a mesh topology, the nodes of 
the network have point-to-point connection with all other nodes of the network. Each 
node can transmit and relay data to other nodes. This helps ensure the flow of information 
through the network because the information can reach its destination through alternative 
paths [18]. An example of a WMN that supports MIO is used by the San Francisco Police 
Department (SFPD) to monitor maritime traffic at the San Francisco Bay entrance (see 
Figure 3). The infrastructure of this network is divided into two clusters. The first 
consists of three point-to-point connections between: (1) the Golden Gate Bridge node 
(GGB tagged white square in Figure 3) and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) node (in Figure 3 its abbreviation is LBNL), (2) LLNL and Alameda Island (the 
white square toward the bottom and right-center of Figure 3), and (3) and Alameda Island 
and Yerba Buena Coast Guard Station (YBI NOC). Note that the red lines in Figure 3 
depict the wireless communications link between the network nodes. The second link 
cluster consists of two nodes: the GGB connected to Coast Guard Yacht Club (CGYC) 
(Pier 45 on Figure 3) and to a SFPD patrol boat (not depicted in Figure 3). This second 
cluster is a mobile mesh network; the future vision is to connect all SFPD patrol boats 




Figure 3.   San Francisco Bay Area mesh network backbone (Image from CENETIX 
website) 
Wireless mesh networks usually consist of mesh clients, mesh routers, and 
gateways. The mesh clients can be portable computers, cell phones, or other wireless 
devices, while the mesh routers forward traffic to and from the gateways, which are not 
necessarily connected to the Internet [18]. An example of a mesh network connecting 
stationary and mobile clients is depicted in Figure 4. WMNs can enable IEEE 802.11 and 
802.16 standards. A characteristic that defines a WMN is that the nodes at the core of the 
network are forwarding the data to and from the clients in a multi-hop mode, resulting in 
a MANET formation. Apart from the multi-hop requirement, there are no other 
restrictions on WMN design. Hence, flexibility and versatility are significant WMN 
characteristics and advantages.  
An advantage of a mesh network is its reliability and redundancy. In case a node 
is not able to operate, the rest of the nodes can overcome this situation by establishing 
and retaining communications among them, either directly or via one or more 
intermediate nodes [18], [19]. This is extremely useful for a WMN that supports MIOs, 
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since the connectivity through the network must be retained even though one or more 
participating nodes may fail, move out of range, or have its propagation path temporarily 
blocked. During MIO, nodes often experience the latter two challenges. WMNs have 
self-healing, self-forming, and self-organization attributes that are beneficial, not only for 
MIOs, but for military operations in general.  
A WMN can be considered a special category of wireless ad-hoc networks. A 
WMN usually has a more organized configuration and can support dynamic and cost-
effective connectivity over a particular and wide geographic area. The mesh routers can 
be mobile and move according to specific requirements occurring in the network (e.g., 
the requirements of nodes consisting of vessels that are moving on the sea surface during 
a MIO). Mesh routers do not usually face the resource constraints that network nodes 
may encounter because they are usually located within the network topology in such as 
way as to be supplied with the necessities (e.g., nodes ashore supplied with unlimited 
energy etc.). This results in an ability of mesh routers to have higher and more reliable 
performance. [18], [19] 
 
Figure 4.   A wireless mesh network interconnecting stationary and mobile clients 
(From [19]) 
Because of their flexibility and adaptability, WMNs can efficiently satisfy the 
requirements of multiple applications, such as broadband Internet access and mobile user 
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access and connectivity. Mesh connectivity significantly contributes to network 
performance enhancement, such as fault tolerance, load balancing, throughput, protocol 
efficiency, and reduction of effective cost. However, there are drawbacks of WMN that 
need to be taken under consideration, such as the determination of bandwidth that each 
subscriber of the network can receive, the security of the network, and the transmission 
power level that ensures connectivity among the network nodes. [18], [19] 
3. Wireless  ad-hoc Sensor Networks (WSN) 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is one of the most robust types of networks for 
wireless communications for both civilian and military use. In a WSN, communication is 
achieved and maintained with the use of spatially distributed autonomous sensor nodes 
capable of collecting information (e.g., communications, radar, video, etc.). WSNs 
typically have a significant number of wireless ad-hoc network features (e.g., the capacity 
for infrastructure-less setup and minimal dependence on network planning). These 
characteristics facilitate rapid WSN setup, especially where there is a lack of an existing 
network or where a fixed infrastructure network is infeasible due to various 
circumstances (e.g., networks used for tactical battlefield operations). There are both 
military and civilian WSN applications, such as the detection of an unauthorized person 
or asset intruding into an area of interest, object tracking, and fire detection. [21]  
A wireless ad-hoc sensor network consists of a number of sensor nodes spread 
across a defined geographical area [22]. Each sensor node has wireless-communication 
capability and some level of intelligence (e.g., radar, meteorological sensors) for signal 
processing and dissemination of data. The characteristic that distinguishes WSNs from 
WMNs and MANETs is that the primary role of a WSN node is not just communication, 
but mainly data gathering by the sensor and dissemination through the network [22]. The 
following list contains examples of some wireless ad-hoc sensor networks; it is drawn 
from the NIST website: 
• Military sensor networks for detection of enemy movements or other 
important phenomena like explosions 
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• Sensor networks for detection of chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) materials or attacks.1  
• Sensor networks for detection and monitoring of environmental 
phenomena (e.g., ocean currents or sea states that may affect the conduct 
of an operation). 
• Wireless sensor networks for surveillance and monitoring of navigational 
traffic in maritime channels or more expanded areas. For example, 
networks consisting of smart buoys on which radars are mounted for the 
monitoring of an area such as San Francisco Bay.  
• Wireless-sensor surveillance networks for providing security in public 
places or other facilities monitored by police authorities or security 
companies 
The capabilities of wireless ad-hoc sensor networks have a pivotal role in both 
civilian and military operations. Wireless sensor networks for geological data, ecosystem 
monitoring, and weather forecasting are depicted in Figure 5, below. 
                                                 
1 This kind of sensor networks has a lot of applications during MIO operations since one of the main 
scopes of MIO is the detection of the CBRNE materials and the prevention of their illegal transportation. 
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Figure 5.   WSNs for geological data, ecosystem monitoring and weather forecasting 
(Image from Network Intell website) 
WSN are classified according to two characteristics: individually addressable 
nodes and network data aggregation. For example, a sensor node of a network deployed 
at sea for surveillance should be individually addressable in order to detect and track a 
target within its coverage area and relay this information to the rest of the network. On 
the other hand, in a case where other data such as sea state or temperature is needed, 
perhaps addressability is not important since any node in the area is able to respond. The 
ability of a sensor network to aggregate collected data, results in a reduction in the 
number of messages that will be distributed across the network nodes. [22] 
Generally, the function of an ad-hoc sensor network relies on the needs that lead 
to the concept of this particular network. The following roles are important in a 
significant number of networks [22]: 
• Determination of values at a particular location. More specifically, a given 
sensor node is not necessarily comprised of one sensor type; rather, it can 
be comprised of different types of sensors, each with a different sampling 
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rate and measured values. For example, in a MIO network, one sensor 
node might detect a vessel, another node might collect information for the 
classification of a vessel, another might sense the presence of hazardous 
material (e.g., CBRNE) on the vessel, and a final camera sensor might 
transmit real-time pictures to other nodes of the network.  
• Detection of an event of interest, including reporting data about the 
event’s emergence, and estimation or evaluation of the event’s parameters. 
An example is a sensor network designed for traffic monitoring, where 
police authorities can detect a vehicle moving on a highway and estimate 
its speed and direction. 
• Classification and identification of a detected object. In a network for sea-
area surveillance, it is important to correlate a detected vessel with other 
sources of information such as that provided by the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS). AIS is required on all vessels over fifteen 
meters and it broadcasts identification data (e.g., vessels name, departure 
and destination port etc.) about the vessel it resides on; hence, a contact 
detected by a node with a radar sensor can amplify the contact with 
classification information such as merchant vessel or warship. 
• Tracking of an object of interest. For example, in a network like the above 
that is used for the classification and identification of a target, tracking a 
suspect vessel during its movement through a geographical area is covered 
by the network. This function is important, since the continuous tracking 
of a suspicious vessel gives the opportunity for friendly forces to be aware 
of its position at any time and to interfere when judged necessary by 
superior authorities. [22] 
In all four roles above, the most significant requirement of the sensor network is 
that the necessary data be distributed to the proper end users. In most cases, the relay of 
data among the nodes is done under extremely tight time constraints. For example, the 
detection of a suspect vessel in a maritime surveillance network should trigger immediate 
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feedback to the authorities (e.g., coast guard or naval forces) responsible for the area. 
This feedback allows the authorities to take or adjust actions appropriately.  
A wireless ad-hoc sensor network, specifically one designed for MIO, requires the 
following [22]: 
• A significant number of sensors. The deployment of many sensors on the 
sea surface or in the air may be required as events unfold; hence 
scalability is a major factor.  
• Energy consumption: A network designed to facilitate MIO operations, or 
other naval operations, requires that the majority of sensor nodes are 
placed in remote areas where maintenance to those nodes may be difficult. 
An example is a smart buoy node in a sea area: the lifetime of that node 
depends on the battery life or fuel cell, thus the minimization of energy 
consumption is necessary. 
• Network self-organization. The significant number of nodes and their 
potential deployment in unprotected and non-friendly locations 
necessitates that the network have self-organization capabilities, since 
manual configuration may not be possible. Furthermore, some nodes may 
stop operating for a variety of reasons, such as destruction or malfunction. 
Additionally, other nodes may join the network according to the nature of 
the operation. Consequently, the network must be able to readjust itself 
whenever necessary to preserve functionality. Even though individual 
nodes may get disconnected from the network, reliable connectivity has to 
be preserved at a high level. 
• Querying ability. During a MIO, an individual node or a group of nodes 
may need to be queried (e.g., if hazardous material is detected) for 
information collected within its assigned region. According to the amount 
of data fusion performed at a node, there is a potential for the node to face 
difficulties due to the transmission of a large amount of the data across the 
network. This situation requires that data from a particular area be 
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collected by various local sink nodes,2 these nodes may create and relay 
summary messages. A query may be directed to the closest node to the 
specific location’s sink node.  
• Collaborative signal processing: One significant difference between 
WSNs and MANETs is that the objective of a WSN is not only 
communication preservation among the network nodes, but also the 
detection/classification of some events of interest (e.g., detection of 
explosives during the boarding of a suspicious vessel). Data fusion from 
multiple sensors contributes to improved detection/classification 
performance during military operations, even though it may result in 
network architecture limitations, since it requires data transmission and 
messages control. [22] 
Nowadays, with the availability of low-cost, short-range radios along with 
progress in wireless networking, wireless ad-hoc sensor networks have several 
applications. Every node can be equipped with various sensors, such as radar, acoustic, 
infrared, video camera, and radiological. These sensor nodes may be organized in clusters 
that report local-event detections to the other nodes of the cluster. Nodes in the cluster 
then fuse the data to form a local estimate. One node can be eligible to operate as the 
cluster master and fitted with a longer-range radio using a protocol such as IEEE 802.11 
or 802.16. The cluster-master node is able to produce a global estimate and report the 
results to other clusters or to the end node of the network. The concept of cluster master 
promotes cost and energy efficiency, since long-range radios are expensive and often 




                                                 
2 A sink node in a WSN is a node where the data collected by other sensor nodes is forwarded. The 
appropriate placement of a sink node positively affects the energy consumption of the WSN and its 
potential operating life. In some cases the end node of the network can form a sink node [23]. 
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C. SENSOR NETWORK DESIGN FOR MIO 
Αd-hoc networks usually do not have a fixed network infrastructure like that of 
cellular-phone networks; consequently, rapid deployability and adaptability are 
advantageous attributes, particularly in the case of networks designed for MIO, and more 
generally for naval operations. As Seapahn Meguerdichian et al., precisely describe in 
their article about exposure in wireless ad-hoc networks, [25] “integration of inexpensive, 
power efficient, and reliable sensors in nodes of wireless ad-hoc networks, with 
significant computational and communication resources, allows better exploitation of the 
attributes of this kind of network.” Previous research [6] analyzes multi-objective, 
evolutionary algorithms for sensor-network design; this can be applied to MIO networks 
as follows (borrowing heavily from [6]). 
1. MIO Sensor-Network Design Philosophy 
As Lam Thu Bui et al [6] describe, a wireless sensor network typically consists of 
a significant number of sensor nodes, individually processing and executing simple 
algorithms and exchanging information with each other and a fusion center via wireless 
communications channels. Sensor networks are used for monitoring and possible control 
of units during military operations (e.g., surveillance, regional security monitoring, 
hazardous-material detection, etc.). When designing a network to support MIO and 
regional security monitoring operations, the lifetime maximization and information that 
can be extracted from the network are put in balance with energy consumption, latency, 
and deployment cost. 
 Sensors of WSNs for MIOs and naval operations can be distributed randomly in 
austere environments, such as open seas with rough conditions, or in particularly well 
defined positions, such as a sensor network for surveillance of a maritime channel, such 
as the SFPD mesh network (Figure 3). In all cases, the sensor nodes are coordinated to 
obtain continuous communication through the network, exploiting the multi-hop 
phenomenon with several clusters and cluster heads. Cluster heads are powerful sensor 
nodes with higher battery capacity and processing capability than that of conventional 
sensor nodes.  
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The sensors of the MIO or security network capture the data (e.g., radioactive-
hazard detection), process it, and relay it to the other nodes or to a base station3, if it is 
within communications connectivity range. Each specific application defines the data 
reporting frequency and the sensor’s number that processed the data. Some issues that 
affect and define the whole design of a MIO sensor network are the following: 
• Fault tolerance is a significant factor during the network-design phase 
because the sensor nodes are susceptible to potential malfunction and may 
run out of energy, since they are not supplied with limitless power.  
• There are enough limitations on the energy, processing, and storage 
capacities of the sensor nodes depending to the role and nature (e.g., node 
equipped with radar requires consumes much more energy than a node 
with a camera or CBRNE sensor) of each particular network node. 
• Scalability is significant, since a MIO and other dynamic military tasks 
have the potential to require a rapid change in the number of participating 
assets and nodes. 
• Topology changes have to be considered, since the mobility of some nodes 
during MIO may result in difficulties in the communications among other 
nodes (e.g., because of distance, physical obstacles, or electromagnetic 
environment). 
• Since environmental noise and other propagation effects (e.g., scattering 
and ducting) affect all communication and sensor-systems performance, it 
is well understood that data transmission through the network has to 
overcome the above phenomena. 
• Survivability of a MIO network has to be examined thoroughly because 
sensor networks are data centric: the loss of a few nodes may cause severe 
degradation of the network and lead to operational failure [6]. 
                                                 
3 A base station can be the end node of the network where all the data is gathered, processed, and 
evaluated and can be either on a ship or on land. 
 21 
2. Sensor Placement Problem in MIO 
Theoretically, sensor placement should be based on some optimal node locations 
that maximize the flow of data stream (e.g., characters, voice, and video data, etc.) 
through the network. In practice, however, a MIO poses significant optimization 
limitations due to constantly changing node positions, and range and propagation path 
challenges. In a MIO, it is not necessary to maintain connectivity among all nodes, but it 
is among those nodes that have a critical role in the delivery of information to the desired 
end node. The main factors affecting node positioning are the following: 
• The detection probability, which indicates the efficiency of the sensor 
network to detect a target. 
• The deployment cost, which depends on the sensor numbers. In the case of 
a homogeneous network, the cost is proportional to the number of sensors. 
As MIO networks are heterogeneous (i.e., their nodes have different 
capabilities and roles), the deployment cost is given by the equation 
 , where n is the number of nodes, Ci is the cost of a node of 
type I, and Ti is the number of nodes of type i.  
• Since the nodes of the network transmit data, energy consumption, 
depends on the distance that data is transferred between the nodes and the 
sink. The energy consumption of the network is calculated as the total 
energy consumed at each individual node. In a MIO network, where some 
nodes are portable and cannot be supplied with infinite power (i.e., they 
are dependent on batteries, fuel cells, or solar panels), energy consumption 
is a key factor. 
There is much research investigating the sensor-placement problem from 
detection and coverage perspectives (for example, see Kar and Banerjee [2003] [26], 
Jourdan and De Weck [2004] [27]). While each research project has much the same 
scope, they have different approaches to the problem. For example, one project examines 
the placement problem for grid coverage, developing an iterative sensor-placement 
algorithm for optimal area coverage. Other researchers approach this problem from the 
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perspective of enhancing the detection of scattered targets in a particular area. Regardless 
of their approach, all researchers aim to reduce sensor numbers through simultaneous 
optimization of coverage, connectivity, and asset lifetime. A method used by Ferentinos 
and Tsiligridis (2007) is the selective activation of network sensors. Some nodes work as 
cluster heads to get optimal energy consumption and application requirements, such as 
uniformity of sensor measurements, while addressing connectivity limitations [6], [28].  
3. Mobile Agent4 Routing 
Obviously, data transmission among the sensor network nodes, uses, apart from 
energy consumption network bandwidth. This situation results in possible delays in 
information relay and network-performance reduction. For this problem, a mobile agent 
is used to fuse the data according to operational needs. The agent-routing problem aims 
to compute mobile agent routes to ensure maximum detection accuracy and minimize 
energy consumption and path-loss effects. More specifically, 
• Detection accuracy is calculated as the sum of the detected signal energies 
of all nodes along the route. Ensuring higher detection accuracy lets the 
sink extract appropriate conclusions about target data, such as type and 
location. For example, during the boarding phase of a MIO, a reliable 
sensor for IED detection can inform the end node (e.g., the officer in 
tactical command [OTC]) of the presence or absence of explosive 
materials in the investigated vessel. This leads to a decision by the OTC 
regarding the need for further evaluation and actions. 
• Because of free-space propagation, there is signal attenuation in each link 
of the mobile agent route that deals with path loss, and this has to be 
addressed—actually minimized—to obtain the required communication to 
support the MIO. The path loss of a route is equal to the sum of path loss 
along each link of the route. According to Friis’s free-space propagation 
                                                 
4 A Mobile Agent is a hardware unit with high communication and processing capabilities employed 
to traverse the network (e.g., aerial or ground vehicles or even light nodes able to hop through the network) 
when data gathering and network maintenance is required. Continuous presence of these agents during 
network operation is not required [29].  
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model, the relation between the power Prj received by sensor j and the 
power Pti transmitted by sensor i is given by the following equation (2.1): 
 
 
Equation 2.1: Friis’s free-space propagation model [6] 
 
where Gti is the gain of transmitting sensor antenna i, Grj is the gain of the 
receiving sensor antenna j, λ is the wavelength of the transmitted signal, dij 
the distance between the two sensors, and β is the system loss factor. The 
path loss of the wireless link in dB is given by the following equation (2.2) 
PLij = 10log(Pti / Prj) 
Equation 2.2: Path loss of the wireless link in dB [6] 
 
Also, the total path loss through a path is the sum of the path losses of each 
individual link along the path, given by the following equation (2.3): 
 
Equation 2.3: Total Path loss [6] 
where l is the total number of nodes along the path. 
• The energy consumption of a route, like the sensor-placement problem, is 
equal to the total energy consumed by each sensor of the route during data 
processing and transmission. 
There are several advantages to using mobile agents in a WSN. Some of those 
advantages are latency reduction during data transmission, autonomous operation, 
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information retrieval in balance with energy consumption, and simultaneous data 
processing. Mobile-agent applications include target detection, localization, 
classification, and surveillance of an assigned area. The determination of route (i.e., the 
sequence and number of sensors, that a mobile agent follows defines the accuracy of 
detection, energy consumption, and path loss of the route [6]. 
4. Data Aggregation 
Data aggregation is the process by which data from multiple sensors is gathered to 
address and eliminate unnecessary transmissions, providing the flow of information 
through the network and the arrival of this information at the end node. The main scope 
of data aggregation is to congregate the most crucial data from the sensors and make it 
available to the end node in an energy-efficient mode with minimum-possible data 
latency. This process is useful, not only for MIO networks, but for every military WSN 
because during a military operation, there is a significant and sometimes rapidly 
increased flow of data based on the development of events during an operation. It is 
absolutely necessary to transmit the data from some of these events; however, some data 
may not have much importance at a particular moment. For example, in a MIO network 
during the vessel-seizure phase, perhaps the information that needs to reach the end node 
soonest is video pictures taken by the boarding team, and not information about 
atmospheric conditions in the area. Data-aggregation algorithms are very important, since 
they contribute to network lifetime and data-accuracy enhancements that are related to 
energy efficiency. The energy efficiency of a WSN depends on various factors, such as 
network architecture, data-aggregation mechanisms, and underlying routing protocols 
[30]. More specifically: 
• Data accuracy relies on the applications of the sensor network. For 
example, during target detection, its location estimation at the sink 
determines data accuracy [6]. 
• A data aggregation is considered energy efficient if it maximizes network 
functionality (e.g., energy consumption increases the lifetime of network 
nodes ensuring the robust flow of information through the network). Using 
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the hypothesis that all sensors have the exact same role, energy-
consumption minimization of each sensor has to be applied. [30] 
• Network lifetime is the number of data aggregation rounds that it takes 
until a predefined percentage of sensors cannot operate any more, due to 
their available-power depletion.[6] 
•  Latency is the delay occurring in data transmission, routing, and data 
aggregation. Actually, latency is defined as the intermediate time between 
the transmission of the generated data from a node and its reception at the 
network’s end node [6]. 
5. Area Coverage 
Wireless sensor networks, either for MIO or for other military purposes, aim to 
monitor and cover their pre-assigned area. Coverage is one of the most important factors 
and is a measure of network quality of service (QoS). The coverage area of the network is 
defined as the fraction of the whole assigned area and that which is covered by the 
totality of network sensor nodes. Coverage, network lifetime, and deployment cost are 
the most significant factors for the area-coverage problems of a sensor network. It is 
easily understood that to ensure the coverage of a particular area by a sensor network, 
each location of interest in the monitoring region has to be within the effective range of at 
least one sensor. This situation is achieved with the activation of a subset of sensors, 
which results in the coverage of every location of interest while other sensors of the 
network that do not possess vital data can hibernate to conserve power. So the collected 
data can be relayed from the sensor node to the sink with successive relays through the 
array of network nodes [6]. An example of a network where the information from a 
source node arrives at the destination node with successive relays is depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.   Multi-hop relay in a network (Image from Nomadic Technologies website)  
The model that is usually used in order to define and depict a sensor node’s 
coverage area is a disk in two dimensions or a sphere in three dimensions. Any point 
within the area is considered covered by the sensor node. In reality, the coverage area 
differs, since the presence of obstacles cannot be excluded. For a MIO, obstacles to 
coverage are often islands, large vessels crossing the area of interest, and even 
environmental conditions such as fog. These may interfere with the line of sight (LOS) 
between two or more nodes. Obstacles affect the propagation of radio frequency (RF) 
signals (for communications) and electromagnetic (E/M) signals (for sensors such as 
radars). This happens because obstacles may absorb or reflect the signal depending on the 
nature of the obstacle; obstacles render the area behind them invisible to the sensor node. 
Some research on the coverage problem uses a two-dimensional field as its model. Even 
though it is much easier to develop algorithms for a two-dimensional versus a three-
dimensional model, the extracted results may not be sufficient for many real-world 
environments. Real coverage issues are predicated in three dimensions, since the nodes of 
a network can be deployed on land, sea, underwater, in the air, or in space. [31]. A model 
of a three-dimensional coverage diagram is depicted in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.   Three-Dimensional Coverage Model (From [31]) 
Apart from two- and three-dimensional models for the determination of a sensor-
network coverage area, a “Voronoi diagram” is frequently used during network studies. 
The Voronoi diagram for a sensor network consists of polygons depicting boundaries 
around each sensor, such that every point within a sensor’s boundary is closer to that 
sensor than any other sensor in the network. Voronoi diagrams are used by researchers to 
detect potential shadow areas in coverage and extract deployment protocols to control 
sensor movement. The vector-based algorithm forces network sensors to alter their 
position to fill a coverage hole in any of their Voronoi polygons. The Voronoi-based 
algorithm directs a sensor towards a coverage gap [31]. A Voronoi diagram is depicted in 
Figure 8.  
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Figure 8.   Voronoi diagram (From [31]) 
The sections above make it clear that the design and concept of an ad-hoc network 
for MIO and regional security operations needs significant forethought and examination. 
Operational requirements need to be put in balance with asset availability and effective 
cost, not only for network construction but also its functioning (e.g., maintenance and 
energy consumption). The progress over the last decade in sensing and communications 
technology gives opportunity and flexibility for the accomplishment of this scope, since 
there are a huge variety of methods and means that can be employed for the construction 
of those networks.  
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IΙΙ. MIO NETWORK OPERATIONAL CONCEPT  
A. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MIO NETWORKS 
A network designed for military and general regional security purposes has to 
provide reliable communications among the participating nodes and facilitate the flow of 
information—voice, video or data—during the operation. Moreover, network adaptability 
is critical to allow adjustments based on current circumstances and future operations 
demands that may affect the network (e.g., node positioning and increases in the amount 
of data transmission requirements). 
In MIO and other regional maritime security operations, the majority of the nodes 
are not stationary, but move and operate on the sea surface or in the air. This attribute 
burdens the network and affects performance. Moreover, as in all military operations, the 
flow of data may increase excessively during an operation’s execution, hence network 
adaptability is key to ensure tactical success by enabling all necessary information to 
reach the end node of the network That end node can then relay the information wherever 
needed. Since the flow of information can be high enough, the network must have the 
capacity to support the amount of communication and provide sufficient transmission 
speeds as well as security and reliability of information flow. 
The network for a MIO must consist of various kinds of sensor nodes. Some 
nodes must be equipped with radar devices for ensuring the surveillance and monitoring 
of an area within their effective range; other nodes need a camera to transmit real-time 
pictures/video; others may have electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR) equipment for 
better surveillance and target classification at night. Equipment used for detection of 
CBRNE material is necessary for MIO and regional security operations. For example, the 
boarding team during the sweep phase of a MIO may transmit real-time video from the 
suspect ship from helmet cameras while simultaneously transmitting information from 




nodes whose role is just to relay the data to the end node (multi-hop) is essential. The 
number and the type of nodes of the network are highly related to the area of interest and 
potential threat. 
Previous research [32] makes a precise analysis of the attributes that a network 
designed for a MIO must have. According to Stavroulakis, some critical factors that 
affect network performance are the sufficiency and portability of equipment, since MIO 
teams must employ portable devices when embarking on a vessel during the boarding 
phase of a MIO, and the network might need to scale up because of environmental 
challenges, such as electromagnetic interference and weather conditions.  
As mentioned above, the power capacity and consumption of a node, whether 
portable or deployed on the sea surface during an operation, is a significant factor that 
affects the design of the network and the planning and execution of the operation. During 
the design phase, there must be consideration for this issue and alternative solutions in 
case some nodes become depleted of energy. For example, the boarding team must carry 
additional power-supply devices such as batteries for the equipment, or other assets must 
be placed in such an array that a node that runs out of energy is covered by another node, 
facilitating the uninterrupted flow of information.  
In the case where multiple boardings are required, the deployment time (i.e., 
transport and set up) of the network equipment used by the team affects mission success 
because slow MIO operations can cause a host of mission problems (e.g., increased 
surveillance requirements of waiting ships and health/sanitary problems arising of 
waiting ships). Furthermore, the dimensions of the equipment may affect network overall 
performance. For example, it is obvious that portable equipment must be within a 
particular size and weight to be carried and used by the boarding teams. In regional 
security operations when nodes are on buoys that are deployed temporarily to facilitate 
networking, they must have a shape and weight that allows for storage and timely, 
satisfactory deployment from a ship or aircraft. 
Another critical factor in operation execution is the effective range for direct 
communication between two nodes of the network and the overall effective transmission 
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range with the multi-hop effect exploitation. During MIO and regional security 
operations, a primary goal is the interdiction of dangerous material before they reach a 
vital area (e.g., port or population center). Moreover, during MIO execution, the 
command post in tactical command may need to keep a safe distance from the seized 
vessel to avoid damage in case of explosion or bio-hazardous emissions from the cargo. 
The effective communications range of each node (i.e., the per hop transmission range) 
that a node covers relies on several factors, such as frequency, transmission power, 
antenna gain, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), height of antenna, and atmospheric conditions. 
The effective communication range significantly affects the number of nodes required to 
ensure the uninterrupted flow of data and, consequently, the total cost of the network 
construction and management burden. Theoretically the range within which two nodes 
can communicate is derived by the following Friis propagation model fundamental 










Equation 3.1: Friis propagation model fundamental equation [6] 
where Prj is the power of the received signal at node (j) sensitivity, Pti the 
transmission power of node (i), Gti is the gain of transmitting sensor antenna i, Grj is the 
gain of the receiving sensor antenna j, λ is the wavelength of the transmitted signal, Rij 
the distance between the two sensors (i), (j), and β is the system-loss factor. Ad-hoc 
network nodes usually communicate within line of sight (LOS), and their 
communications range is calculated by the following equation (3.2):  
1 21.23( )LOSR h h= +  
Equation 3.2: LOS communications range [33] 
where RLOS is the range measured in nautical miles, and h1, h2 the height of each node 
antenna from sea level, measured in feet. The height of the antenna depends on the 
location of the node, for example, if the node is on a ship, we may have an antenna height 
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of 50ft or more; if we have a small boat it will not exceed 15 ft; and in the case of a buoy, 
the antenna is likely to be at most 6–7 ft tall. However, despite those calculatoins, current 
ad-hoc networks nodes have limited ranges, unless they make use of the SATCOM or 
WiMAX standard, rarely exceeding 4 km (2.2 nautical miles), depending on the factors 
mentioned above and affected significantly by energy-availability constraints. So, to 
avoid a high-density vertices network5 that may be costly, somewhat difficult to deploy, 
and may require the nodes within the transmitting area to be silent so as not to corrupt 
transmission [34], the assets should be able to transmit data as far as possible. However, 
the data will be transmitted to the end node of the network by using the multi-hop effect 
through the nodes. Willis and Kikkert developed a model showing that communication 
between two nodes separated by 10 km (5.4 nautical miles) is not only feasible, but 
reliable as well. However, their model considered a frequency of 40MHz and an effective 
isotropic radiated power (EIRP) equal to 1 Watt transmitted over irregular terrain, an 
attribute that the sea surface terrain does not have except in rough seas [35]. A distance of 
5.4 nautical miles is highly desirable for networks designed for MIO and regional 
security operations, since a non-excessive number of nodes can cover a wide area.  
A fact affecting the communication of the maritime nodes is the mobility of the 
majority of the assets, since they are not permanently stationed. This constant movement 
on the sea surface and in the air results in continuous increases or decreases in node 
separation. However, for avoiding the potential of limited or even no communication 
among some nodes, making the arrival of information to the end node impossible, an 
option of implementing alternative equipment that provides vertices with Global System 
for Mobile Communications/General Packet Radio Service (GSM/GPRS) or satellite 
communications has to be considered. Also a potential employment of WiMAX or IEEE 
802.16 standard in the networks can dramatically increase the communications range 
among nodes, and consequently the network coverage, since the transmitted signal can 
reach at distances beyond LOS to around 50 km (27 nautical miles) with high data rates 
up to 100 Mbps [14], [15]. Moreover in order to simplify the communication of the 
                                                 
5 High-density vertices networks are networks composed by a large amount of nodes gathered in a 
small area. The number of the network nodes is disproportional to the area where the network operates.  
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nodes, such as transceiver-antenna alignments in the case of directional antennas, 
omnidirectional antennas should be used instead of directional. 
Since MIO take place at sea, the equipment used must have resistance to sea 
conditions such as humidity, temperature changes, water, and salinity. For example, the 
equipment used by swimmers and divers who check the hulls of suspect ships obviously 
needs to be waterproof. Furthermore, the equipment must be tolerant of the vibrations 
caused by sea waves. Assets such as buoys that are deployed for network facilitation 
and/or surveillance have to retain stability on the sea surface regardless of the sea state. 
Another factor to consider during the network design phase is the electromagnetic 
interference that affects network nodes, not only with external/out-of-network assets such 
as radar and radio transmission from ships, but also the mutual interference among nodes. 
Since there may be multiple vertices equipped with radar, their transmission can cause 
problems to the communication within the network. During the execution of a MIO, the 
presence of ships equipped with radar transmitting under high power may cause 
burdensome electromagnetic interference. Addressing this problem entails defining 
transmission sectors for radars, lowering/managing output power, or, if necessary, using 
means of communications other than the network [32].  
A significant requirement for ad-hoc sensor networks supporting MIO and 
regional security operations is the security of information distributed through the 
network. Since there is no physical connection between nodes, and data is distributed 
over the air using electromagnetic waves, there is the potential that the transmitted 
information may be intercepted by anyone within a node’s transmission range. The 
network is also vulnerable to cyber attacks, such as malicious codes resulting in denial of 
services (DoS) or even the collapse of the entire network. IEEE 802.11 provides security 
to the network with the use of open or shared key authentication and static wired-
equivalent privacy (WEP) keys. Security of the ad-hoc sensor network can be enhanced 
with the use of a virtual private network (VPN) and intrusion-detection systems (IDS). A 
VPN tunnel encrypts the transmitted data additionally to the WEP encryption. VPN can 
be used as well for the encryption of WiMAX (IEEE 802.16) standard communications. 
[21], [36].  
 34 
For ensuring continuous and reliable functionality during an operation, a network 
operation center (NOC) should be established, not necessarily in the area of operations. 
The NOC assists in managing and monitoring the network. A primary function is 
monitoring all the participating nodes to ensure that they are connected to the network 
and working properly. If monitoring uncovers problems in the network, then the NOC 
assists in providing solutions whenever necessary. Another role of the NOC is to provide 
accessibility to new users/nodes on the network, an attribute necessary for MIO networks 
that alter the number of participating nodes. The NOC can make use of several 
applications for network management such as fault management/service restoration, 
trouble-ticket administration, configuration management, security management, 
performance management and accounting management [37]. A picture of network 
performance monitoring used by a NOC is depicted in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9.   Network Performance Monitor (From Solarwinds website) 
B. ASSETS CONSISTING OF NODES IN A MIO NETWORK 
MIO and naval operations related to regional security generally take place at sea, 
either close to coastal areas or far away from shore on the open sea. It is obvious that the 
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majority of assets used for the conduct of an operation will be deployed at sea or in the 
air. However, the use of shore-based stations cannot be excluded, especially when the 
operation evolves near a coast. The assets that may carry nodes of a MIO ad-hoc sensor 
network are the boarding team (in the equipment carried by the team), surface vessels 
(ships or boats), aerial vehicles such as UAVs, unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), 
buoys, swimmer or diver equipment, and shore-based nodes, whether mobile (e.g., trucks 
equipped with sensors and antennas or personnel with equipment) or stationary (e.g., a 
headquarters, an antenna, or a sensor for relaying data to other nodes). 
1. Boarding Team 
During a MIO, a team may board a suspicious vessel. Apart from inspecting the 
ship’s documentation (i.e., manifest) and crew (e.g., checking the crew and passenger list 
against watchlists), the team may search for the presence of illegal and dangerous 
material in the cargo such as CBRNs or IEDs. The data from sophisticated sensors can be 
transmitted from the boarded ship to another station for evaluation. For the detection of 
this material, the team has to carry appropriate sensors as they search the ship. A sensor 
that may be carried by the boarding team is the adaptable radiation area monitor (ARAM) 
developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). According to NPS-
LLNL field-experiments and student studies, ARAM is already integrated into the mesh 
network of SFPD patrol vessels in San Francisco Bay Area for long-term data capture 
and analysis. The ARAM system makes use of commercial constituents and software 
developed by LLNL for preventive radiological and nuclear detection (PRND) for MIO 
[20]. An ARAM sensor is depicted in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10.   ARAM sensor (from [20]) 
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The LLNL software processes the detection signal from the sensor, providing a 
diagram of the gamma-count rate or gamma-energy spectrum, and with the use of “Glau” 
software, stores the gathered data and produces spectrum files that are available to users 
of the network, informing them about the existence of radiological material [20]. A 
diagram of a gamma count rate with the use of Glau software is depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Glau software showing a spike in gamma-count rate (from [20])  
Furthermore, the boarding team can have video and voice equipment to transmit 
real-time pictures from the ship to other nodes of the network to assist scientist in 
properly and efficiently identifying the source material. The exchange of information can 
be enhanced through text chatting between the boarding team and other participants in 
the network such as CBRN subject matter experts. All data gathered—picture, video, and 
sensor data—from the CBRNE detection sensor can be transmitted from the suspect ship 
through the network with the communications equipment carried by the boarding team. 
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2. Swimmers - Divers 
During MIO and regional security operations, the deployment of swimmers or 
divers in the area of interest may be required to investigate the hull of a seized ship or 
conduct a security check on an object floating in the area of interest for assessment as a 
potential threat. Swimmers should be able to transmit real-time pictures through the 
network via video and voice devices. They may also be able to detect with portable 
sensors whether a suspicious object contains CBRNE material and transmit that data for 
further evaluation by a subject matter expert brought into the network. Obviously the 
equipment carried by a swimmer must be waterproof. During the TNT MIO 11–2 (June 
2011) and TNT MIO 12–2 (June 2012)6 experiments, networked swimmers were 
employed as part of the experiment and successfully transmitted video, voice, and data 
from a portable WMD detector [38]. Networked swimmers for the TNT 11–2 experiment 
are depicted in Figure 12. The portable detector used by swimmers is shown in Figure 13, 
and a snapshot of transmitted video and a videoconferencing window between the 
swimmers and remote experts is shown in Figure 14. 
                                                 
6 The subject of TNT MIO 11-2 and 12-2 experiments was the “Networking and Interagency 
Collaboration On Maritime-Sourced Nuclear Radiological Threat Detection and Interdiction”. These 
experiments were conducted with the cooperation of NPS/LLNL, NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational 
Training Center (NMIOTC), NATO Special Operation Forces (SOF) Headquarters–Belgium, NATO Joint 
Chemical–Biological–Radiological–Nuclear Defense Center of Excellence (NATO JCBRN COE), Swedish 
Defense Research Agency (FOI), and the University of Bundeswehr and Armament Research Development 
and Engineering Center/Joint Situational Awareness System (ARDEC/JSAS). 
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Figure 12.   Networked swimmers for TNT 11–2 (Image from CENETIX website)  
 




Figure 14.   Transmitted video and videoconference between swimmers and experts 
during TNT 11–2 (From [20]) 
3. Vessels 
Apparently, ships and boats can form almost any type of node in a MIO network. 
With the communication and detection equipment that they may have available onboard, 
they are able to operate as a communications relay node, and as a sensor node that 
distributes data such as video or radar, IR, or EO pictures of the area where the ship is 
deployed, and/or data concerning meteorological and atmospheric conditions. They can 
also operate as the end node of a network that gathers, processes, and evaluates all data 
collected by the other nodes of the network. A ship acting as an end node can be the 
flagship of a group or division of ships that execute MIO or other naval operations. An 
important advantage of ships acting as nodes is the fact that they do not have the energy 
constraints that other assets/nodes, such as buoys and UAVs, face. With the variety of 
detection and communication means onboard, they can collect and transmit data in 
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several ways to the desired destination, even to nodes that are not necessarily part of the 
network. Also, ships have the ability to repair potential equipment failures because of 
trained and specialized crew members; making them highly important to network 
performance. Ships may also carry and deploy, according to operational requirements, 
additional nodes, such as the boarding team (even though the team itself cannot be 
considered a node), swimmers, buoys, UAVs and USVs. An SFPD patrol boat that 




Figure 15.   SFPD Patrol Boat  
4. Smart Buoys and USVs 
MIO and regional maritime security operations require the involvement of several 
types of assets. The extent of the area of operations may vary in scale from small areas 
(e.g., a maritime chokepoint encompassing a few square miles) to large area (e.g., 
surveillance of an expanded area for the detection and interdiction of a suspect for acts of 
piracy vessel at the Horn of Africa). Obviously the coverage of a wide area is much more 
complicated than that of a small area. The wider the area, the higher the number of 
assets/nodes required to reliably cover the area with a sensor network. The number of 
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vessels/units deployed for an operation’s needs is not limitless and it is affected by 
several factors such as unit availability, operational evolution, assignment priorities, 
weather conditions, and, of course, cost. To avoid the employment of a significant 
number of ships and UAVs as nodes, the use of buoys as communications-relay nodes or 
sensor nodes can be an acceptable and cost-effective solution. 
Buoys are widely used as sensors for the monitoring and gathering of 
meteorological, oceanographic, and atmospheric data. They transmit this data to several 
users through satellite or GSM/GPRS communications. An example of a buoy network is 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Chesapeake Bay 
interpretive buoy system (CBIBS) that has been deployed in the Chesapeake Bay area 
since 2007 — see Figure 16 [39].  
 
  
Figure 16.   CBIBS deployment area (left) and sensor buoy (right) (Image from CBIBS 
website) 
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Since buoys are regularly used as sensors for environmental monitoring purposes, 
they are also able to work as sensors for naval operations. Apart from radar and 
environmental sensors, cameras and EO/IR devices can be installed, and with the use the 
communications equipment, the data collected by sensors on buoys can be distributed 
throughout a wireless network. The combined use of sensor buoys, ships, and air assets 
can reliably and effectively cover a wide area. A buoy with a camera can transmit real- or 
near real-time pictures of the area around it. That data may facilitate decision making by 
a headquarters responsible for the area of interest. For example, a target detected by radar 
(perhaps installed on a buoy) is difficult to classify if there is no other information or 
intelligence about it. The camera allows the participants in the network to see the 
detected target and provide more data towards identify it. Hence, by taking advantage of 
sensor buoys as nodes in a MIO or regional security network, the continuous monitoring 
of a wide area can be achieved.  
There are several ways that buoys can be used in a MIO network. Apart from 
monitoring a particular area, the buoys may have only a communications relay role 
during an operation. In a MIO network, the buoys can be placed permanently in position 
for the specific the operation (e.g., as a communications relay node during the boarding 
phase), or can float and move towards an area (at very low speeds of around two knots). 
However, a moving buoy is considered an USV or unmanned maritime vessel (UMV). 
A buoy/USV that could be used as a node in an ad-hoc sensor network is the 
Wave Glider sensor-hosting, autonomous, remote craft (SHARC) developed by Liquid 
Robotics, Inc. SHARC is a buoy and USV that is able to travel, patrol, or remain 
stationary. It is equipped with solar panels to collect, transform, and distribute solar 
power to installed sensors. SHARC’s propulsion system is passive and works with the 
glider and fins that operate seven meters below the surface. The glider ensures system 
stability on the surface and converts wave energy to movement giving the SHARC a 
speed of up to two knots, according to sea state. SHARC is highly reliable in retaining its 
stability and operations in rough weather. It has been tested during a 22-ft sea state and 
winds of 50 knots off the Alaskan coast [40]. Figure 17 shows how SHARC looks on and 




Figure 17.   SHARC above and below the surface (Image from Liquid Robotics 
website) 
The MIO-related systems and sensors that have be installed on a SHARC are the 
global positioning system (GPS), AIS, cameras, and meteorological sensors. Some 
subsurface sensors that have been installed include a camera, and acoustic and 
oceanography sensors. It has satellite and local communications capabilities for the 
transmission or relay of collected data. From the energy perspective, apart from the solar 
panels that can give 80 Watts of power, it is equipped with rechargeable batteries with 
665 Watt-hours autonomy for the systems supply needs. A significant attribute of the 
SHARC is its minimal visual and radar signature that make it difficult to be detected by 
enemies and potential saboteurs [41], [42]. With the proper communications equipment, 
SHARC can be a significant part of a MIO network, as a sensor node or just for 
communications relay. Its ability to move lets it take a position among the nodes of a 
MIO network to ensure the uninterrupted flow of data, as it was explained in Chapter II 
concerning the Voronoi diagram (see Figure 8). Due to its dimensions and weight, 
shipboard storage of a SHARC and temporary deployment according to operational 
demands is feasible. A matter that should be examined is the potential for mounting 
CBRN sensors and surveillance equipment such as radar on it, to transmit information 
about CBRN materials and emissions, and a real-time radar picture of its area to the other 
nodes of the network. However, this has to be examined in balance with the energy 
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consumption rates of the sensors. Moreover, the mounting of heavy equipment with 
heights more than six feet may significantly affect the stability of the SHARC. 
A buoy/USV that can be also used capable of acting as a node of a MIO sensor 
network is the BASIL self propelled buoy developed by a French company “ACSA 
Underwater GPS.” BASIL, like the SHARC, can be stationed in a particular position or 
navigate to desired locations or patrol patterns. However, it is not as resistant to rough sea 
conditions as the SHARC, since its maximum operation limit is sea state 3. Its maximum 
speed approaches three knots and its duration of autonomous operations is around eight 
hours. Its propulsion system is electrical. The navigation modes of BASIL are manual, 
route following and station keeping. Due to its dimensions (3.4 x 1.5 x 1.2 meters) and 
weight (380 kg), it can have large payload capable of holding several sensors on it such 
as cameras, CBRNE sensors, and network communication equipment. Since the current 
system design allows up to eight BASIL USVs to be controlled together, dynamic 
coverage of an area and multiple simultaneous sensor measurements can be achieved. 
However, the autonomy of eight hours with the electric propulsion system does not allow 
a long-term deployment of BASIL like the respective of SHARC. So BASIL is more 
likely to be deployed close to ports for the security enhancement of the area [43]. A 
picture of BASIL is depicted in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18.   BASIL buoy/USV (From [43]) 
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The main disadvantage of using a buoy as a sensor node in a MIO ad-hoc sensor 
network is the energy constraints and lack of mobility that this type of platform has. The 
solar panels and the battery that a buoy has for energy needs face difficulties in 
supporting the continuous operation of a radar system or other surveillance equipment, 
such as EO/IR systems, that consume significant power. A possible solution for this 
problem has been developed by SignalGeneriX, a Cypriot Company, in cooperation with 
Hellas-Sat (Hellenic Satellite System) and the Maritime Institute of the Eastern 
Mediterranean; it plans to construct a novel multipurpose, energy-autonomous, smart 
buoy named ARTEMIS that is able to operate in harsh weather at sea and relay data 
gathered by a variety of environmental and security sensors. ARTEMIS’s dimensions and 
weight exceed those of a SHARC; it is eight meters tall and is made of aluminum for 
minimization of movement and maximization of the oscillation period. ARTEMIS has a 
hybrid power system consisting of both solar panels and a diesel power generator. 
According to requirements, the buoy is able to switch from the one power system to the 
other to satisfy energy needs. This system allows the buoy substantial autonomy even 
with radar use. Additionally, for saving energy, ARTEMIS can perform “sleep and wake 
up” and “hibernation” modes when there is no operational requirement. ARTEMIS has 
two platforms where sensors can be adjusted, one above and the other below the surface. 
According to ARTEMIS project representatives, this buoy “can house from one to 
hundreds of off-the-shelf analogue and digital sensors, meeting the needs of different 
demanding environmental, search and rescue, security and military applications.” These 
attributes render it a useful tool in a MIO or regional security network when mounted 
with the appropriate sensing and communications equipment [8]. ARTEMIS’s side and 




Figure 19.   ARTEMIS side and top view (From [8]) 
One disadvantage of buoys as nodes in a MIO network is the exposure of the 
sensors and communications equipment to rough conditions, especially when a buoy is 
placed permanently at sea. The equipment has to face temperature alterations, humidity, 
salinity, and winds. Obviously, maintenance of a buoy is necessary, but the further away 
it is from the coast, the more difficult it is to maintain and repair it. 
Besides buoys, USVs such as small remote-control or autonomous navigation 
boats can be employed as nodes of an ad-hoc MIO network. These small craft can be 
equipped with a wide array of sensors for the investigation of items floating at sea that 
swimmers or staffed units may be hesitant to approach. When such an item is detected 
during an operation, the small USV can be deployed by another unit (e.g., a warship 
conducting a patrol) to examine it at close range and transmit data to other nodes that can 
remain aloof from the potentially dangerous object. The small dimensions of many 
current USVs allow for their storage and deployment from a wide array of vessel such as 
destroyers and patrol boats. 
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Not only are there small remote-control craft, but USVs with dimensions like the 
SFPD patrol boats (see Figure 15) have been developed and can be employed as nodes of 
a MIO network. A Sea Fox USV participated in many TNT MIO network experiments 
that are described in chapter IV. The Sea Fox is a USV developed by “Northwind 
Marine” company. Based on a 17 ft rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB), the Sea Fox is a 
semi-autonomous, high-speed USV capable of conducting unmanned Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations. It can contribute to Force Protection, 
Riverine, and Port Security missions, to name a few. Sea Fox carries Command and 
Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) systems. Its typical configurations 
provide wide bandwidth video, IR and remotely controlled video camera and floodlights, 
and an announcing system. Additionally, Sea Fox has operated with radar, sonar, CBRNE 
detectors and swimmer detection systems. With those systems the USV is able to provide 
other nodes of the network, through wireless RF relays, a remote, real time picture (e.g., 
video or IR) of potential threats, thereby simultaneously increasing safety and situational 
awareness during potentially high threat operations [44], [45]. The 17 ft Sea Fox is 7 ft 
wide and weighs approximately 1300 kg. The command and control link for remote 
control operates at a frequency of 440 MHz and the communication equipment for the 
mesh network works at 2.4 GHz. The maximum speed of Sea Fox is around 35 knots 
[46]. USV Sea Fox is depicted in Figure 20. 
 
  
Figure 20.   USV Sea Fox (From [44], [46]) 
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Another example of a USV that can be used as a node of MIO and Regional 
Security  ad-hoc sensor network is the U-Ranger*7 USV developed by “Calzoni Marine 
Handling and Lighting Solutions.” According to U-Ranger*7 specification sheet, this 
USV is “able to operate as a stand-alone system or integrated in a higher level defense 
system.” U-Ranger*7 is equipped with sensors such as radar, IR and video camera, and 
with its communication equipment, it can be remotely controlled and disseminate through 
the network the data collected by its sensors. Apart from the above sensors categories, 
CBRNE sensors can be integrated with it. According to Calzoni, the U-Ranger*7 is 
designed to conduct ISR operations, patrolling, port protection, piracy interdiction and 
vessel escorting. It can also conduct search and rescue operations, and take over the role 
of a communication relay node in a network. The control modes of USV U-Ranger*7 are 
autonomous, remote control, and manual. In the first case, the vessel moves according to 
a preplanned route and speed, all the while recording its position and collecting data by 
its sensors. In the second case, the USV is remotely controlled over a wireless 
communications link from a manned control console located ashore or on another at-sea 
platform. In the manual mode, the vessel is being driven by a person onboard, so it is no 
longer a USV, rather just a manned power boat. While the U-Ranger*7’s maximum 
speed is 40 knots, it is capable of 12 hours of autonomous operations at a speed of 12 
knots. These 12 hours of autonomy makes it highly desirable as a sensor network node 
for MIO. Moreover its size of 7 meters and weight of 1700 kg allows it to be carried by 
naval ships such as frigates, destroyers, auxiliary ships [47]. Figure 21 shows U-




   
Figure 21.   USV U-Ranger*7 and sensor suite (From [47]) 
5. UAVs 
UAVs are “mini” airplanes and helicopters, and they are becoming prevalent in 
ongoing operations. As mentioned before, some sensor nodes can move in airspace, and 
conduct either surveillance or communications relay according to the needs and the 
topology of the network. Since staffed, large aircraft may be too expensive or vulnerable, 
UAVs offer a good option to participate in ad-hoc sensor networks.  
UAVs can be equipped with several types of sensors, apart from their 
communication systems. A UAV is able to execute surveillance operations with radar or 
cameras, a task that is greatly enhanced by the altitude and speed that this type of asset 
can achieve. Besides the area-surveillance role, UAVs can relay information on a 
suspicious vessel within its assigned area by flying above it, discovering what kind of 
cargo this vessel carries, and assessing whether or not there are people on its deck, etc. 
The collected data can be transmitted to the other nodes of the network with the featured 
communications equipment. As in the case of the previously discussed assets, a UAV is 
able to perform the role of a communications-relay node—they are in fact the best asset 
for this role due to their antenna height. This antenna height, especially for fixed wing 
UAVs that can fly at high altitudes, enable them to establish communications with other 
nodes of the network in greater ranges than a surface assets can. Equation (3.2) explains 
this phenomenon. However, the communication-effective range does not rely only on 
node positioning, but also on factors relevant in equation (3.1). Consequently, the 
effective communications range, even though it is improved by increases in altitude, is 
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still limited to a few nautical miles, unless these assets have alternative communication 
systems like satellite communications or GSM/GPRS and WiMAX. Thus, appropriate 
positioning and assigned sectors for the nodes, even of UAVs, are required for 
uninterrupted flow of information through the network.  
A fixed-wing UAV may be outfitted with CBRNE detectors, but it is difficult to 
take advantage of these sensors because aircraft cannot hover above and safely pass close 
enough to a target to detect CBRNE materials. Another disadvantage of fixed-wing 
UAVs is that they need space for launching and landing. This space is difficult for many 
ships to provide except for aircraft carrier type ships. Most of the current fixed wing 
UAVs operate from land-based stations, resulting in significant reduction in the time they 
can remain in the area of operations when far away from the coast. To address these 
problems, runway independent fixed wing UAVs or mini-helicopter UAVs are a 
convenient and reliable solution.  
A runway independent UAV that can effectively form a node in a MIO sensor 
network is the Integrator developed by “Insitu Inc.” The Integrator is able to disseminate 
exceptional SA with its high quality imagery sensors and its long endurance. A 
significant attribute of this UAV is its versatility to accept payload integration according 
to each individual mission since the payloads are “plug and play.” The sensors that the 
Integrator carries are EO, IR and video cameras, and a laser rangefinder. These sensors 
can be removed and replaced with other type of sensors such as CBRNE detectors. With 
the current communications equipment, Integrator can communicate at distances over 55 
nautical miles and its effective operational range is a radius of 550 nautical miles. Its 
dimensions (wing span 4.8 meters and length 2.2 meters) allow it to be carried and stored 
by a ship, but the launch and recovery system is a pneumatic catapult and Skyhook 
wingtip capture system respectively. Its endurance is 24 hours, which renders it a 
valuable tool for a MIO and regional maritime security operations. Its cruise speed is 
approximately 55 knots and the maximum operational ceiling is 15,000 ft. Integrator is 
guided by a control station from the ground or on a vessel at sea [48]. A picture of 





Figure 22.   UAV Integrator (From [48]) 
Another example of a runway independent UAV that could serve as a node of an 
ad-hoc sensor network for MIO and regional security operations is the Fury 1500 
developed by “AME Unmanned Air Systems.” It has a very long effective operational 
range (1500 nautical miles) and it is designed mainly for ISR missions. Its endurance is 
more than 15 hours and its cruise speed and maximum altitude is 65–95 knots and 15,000 
ft respectively. In a MIO network, the Fury 1500 could form either a communications 
relay node or a sensor capable of disseminating through the network data collected by its 
own sensors such as video-camera, IR sensors, etc. It has a wing span of 3.7 meters and 
length 1.4 meters with maximum weight, including fuel and payload, of 150 kg [49]. A 
picture of Fury 1500 is depicted in Figure 23. 
 
 
Figure 23.   Fury 1500 UAV (From [49]) 
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A fixed wing UAV like those just mentioned is not able to hover above a 
suspicious target in order to detect illicit material. This constraint is ameliorated by 
rotorcraft UAV such as mini-helicopters. A mini-helicopter is able to operate from a ship, 
can be carried and stored easily on a ship, and can hover above a suspicious target or 
floating object. Due to this latter attribute, a mini-helicopter can approach very close to a 
target in comparison to a fixed-wing UAV. A mini-helicopter can operate as a 
communications-relay node and can have CBRNE sensors and cameras for surveillance. 
A radar system is difficult to mount because of the mini-helicopter’s small size and 
carrying capacity. 
During the TNT MIO 11–2 and TNT MIO 12–2 experiments near the NMIOTC, 
described in chapter IV of this thesis, a mini-helicopter UAV named Vellerοfontis was 
equipped with a nuclear-material detector, a surveillance camera, and a networking node. 
The UAV’s role was the detection of radiological materials from above as suspect vessel 
on the move. The network equipment allowed the UAV to transmit detection data and 
video from a vessel in real time to the other nodes of the network. The employment of the 
mini-helicopter extended the range of the detection network during a pursuit of a 
suspicious vessel by friendly patrol forces [38]. This demonstrated that mini-helicopters 
are a responsive and capable asset to investigate the existence of dangerous materials or 
WMD onboard a vessel or floating object. With the use of a UAV helicopter as the node 
of a MIO network, the safety of personnel and units can be improved. Furthermore, UAV 
helicopters may form a communications-relay node, extending the range of the network 
and ameliorating its operational limitations. A picture of the mini-helicopter Vellerofontis 




Figure 24.   Mini-Helicopter Vellerofontis (Image from CENETIX website) 
The SR200 Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) rotorcraft UAV could be 
employed as a node of a MIO ad-hoc sensor network. SR200, developed by “Rotormotion 
LLC,” is equipped with a video camera and an EO/IR sensor. Other types of sensors like 
CBRNE detector are feasible. It has GPS for navigation purposes and location data 
transmission. The SR200 can be controlled either manually by a ground station ashore or 
afloat, or automatically with an autonomous preplanned route. It is able to take off and 
land automatically with the use of GPS and an Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS). 
It utilizes an 802.11 telemetry system. The gathered sensors data is disseminated via the 
802.11 system through the network. Its endurance is more than five hours and its 
operational speed approximately 50 knots. Its dimensions (2.8 and 3 meters length and 
main rotor diameter respectively) and weight (around 50 kg with the payload) allows its 
deployment from small vessels such as patrol boats [50]. A picture of SR200 VTOL UAV 




Figure 25.   SR200 VTOL UAV (From [50]) 
Another VTOL UAV for MIO and regional security operations is the APID 60 
developed by the Swedish company “CybAero AB” in 2012. The APID 60 is a state of 
the art UAV VTOL system consisting of the UAV, the network enabled control station 
and the payload system that can be EO, IR sensors, cameras, Synthetic Aperture Radar 
(SAR), Signal or Communications Intelligence (SIGINT or COMINT respectively), 
CBRNE sensors, communications relay equipment and loudspeakers according to user 
demands. It is also equipped with AIS for vessel identification. The APID 60 UAV can 
fly either semi-manual remotely from the ground or ship-based control station or 
automatically according to a preplanned route. Its current data-link communication 
system can provide real time information to distances of 110 nautical miles. Similarly to 
SR200, the APID 60 UAV is able to approach, land and lock-down on a ship’s deck 
automatically with the use of an automatic ship’s deck landing system. It is made from 
titanium, carbon fiber and aluminum, which renders it corrosion resistant and lightweight. 
Its length is 3.2 meters with a rotor diameter at 3.3 meters. It flies at speeds of 50 knots 
(cruise speed) with an endurance of six to eight hours and it has a maximum speed of 85 
knots. Its total weigh with payload and fuel (gasoline or JP-5) is approximately 230 kg. 
This UAV can form a valuable tool for a MIO and many naval operations due to its 
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capabilities for payload and communications and permit stand-off detection and 




Figure 26.   APID 60 VTOL UAV (From [51]) 
One other reliable VTOL UAV for MIO network support is the Skeldar V-200 
developed by “SAAB technologies.” It is able to carry several payload types such as 
radar, AIS, EO/IR and video cameras, and CBRNE detectors. It can be controlled 
remotely through a data-link at distances more than 55 nautical miles. Its maximum speed 
is 70 knots and its endurance more than 6 hours. Its overall length with the rotor is 5.2 
meters and the maximum take-off weigh is 230 kg [52]. A picture of Skeldar V-200 with 





Figure 27.   SAAB’s Skeldar V-200 with its onboard a vessel operator (From [52]) 
6. Land-Based Stations 
Apart from mobile assets in the sea or air, land-based stations can constitute nodes 
of a MIO or regional security network. These stations can be either stationary, such as 
buildings and sensors infrastructure (e.g., radars, communications antennas), or mobile 
assets, such as trucks equipped with surveillance and communications systems, or even 
people wearing sensors.  
The use of land-based stations for MIO depends on the area of operations and its 
distance from the coast, which is related to the effective communication range among the 
network nodes. Land-based stations can form any kind of sensor nodes in a MIO and 
regional security ad-hoc sensor network. They can be equipped with surveillance systems 
such as radar, EO/IR devices and cameras, meteorological sensors, and communications 
equipment in order to relay to other nodes the data collected by them and from other 
sensor nodes of the network. For example, a node equipped with a radar device can 
execute surveillance of the area within its radar effective range and transmit the picture to 
other nodes of the network. In the case of dense islands in the area, e.g., the Aegean Sea 
in Greece, the establishment of a significant number of sensor nodes can increase the 
coverage of the network, thereby enhancing both surveillance and communication ranges. 




needs of the Hellenic coast guard. The network was intended to create more efficient 
surveillance and maritime situational awareness in the Aegean Sea for countering illegal 
immigration in this area [7].    
A land-based node, such as a building, can form the end node of the network (e.g., 
a headquarters) where all data collected by other nodes is gathered, processed, and 
evaluated for further action. It can also transmit the data to other users who are not 
necessarily participants in the network. The advantage of a stationary, land-based node is 
that a variety of sensing and communications equipment can be installed. There are 
typically no space constraints and energy limitations, since the node is usually 
provisioned by the area’s power-supply infrastructure or portable generators. A land-
based, communications-relay node of the SFPD mesh network positioned at Pier 45 in 
San Francisco Port is depicted in Figure 28.  
 
 
Figure 28.   SFPD relay node on San Francisco Port’s Pier 45 (From [20]) 
If a node for communications relay or some other role is required where there is 
no stationary asset, a mobile node, such as a vehicle, can be employed. The asset can 
collect data and relay it to other nodes of the network within its communication-systems 




Figure 29.   Mobile Surveillance Radar (Image from Mathworks website)  
Obviously, there is a variety of platforms that can be used in an ad-hoc sensor 
network for MIO and regional security operations, and more coming on line every day. 
This leads to flexibility and performance and cost trade-offs. Furthermore, the continuous 
evolution of both communication and sensing systems contributes significantly to 
network design options and enhanced performance potential to meet current operational 
requirements. However, the fact that the nodes are located on different kinds of assets 
requires thorough examination of network design and of the equipment necessary for 
interoperability and data exchange throughout the network. As mentioned previously, ad-
hoc sensor networks have already found application in real-life environments, and 
experiments are being conducted that employ all kind of assets to better comprehend how 




IV. EXPERIMENTATION FIELD  
A. CENTER FOR NETWORK INNOVATION AND EXPERIMENTATION 
(CENETIX) 
As mentioned previously, a series of annual experiments are being conducted 
regarding ad-hoc sensor networks in support of MIO and security operations. During 
these experiments, useful conclusions about the benefits and potential drawbacks of this 
kind of network are extrapolated, resulting in a better understanding of the concepts 
behind them, and how to operate these networks to satisfy operational requirements. A 
series of experiments related to MIO were conducted under the aegis of NPS in 
cooperation with USA and non-USA organizations such as DTRA, LLNL, the 
Department of Homeland Security, and NMIOTC under the leadership of NPS’s 
Professor Alex Bordetsky. A significant tool for the facilitation of experiment execution 
is the Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX). 
CENETIX was founded in 2004 to facilitate research related to self-organizing 
tactical networking and collaboration. The research subjects that CENETIX studies are 
flexible and scalable wireless networks, network-controlled unmanned vehicles, sensors, 
and situational-awareness (SA) platforms. CENETIX incorporates and operates the NPS 
tactical-network topology (TNT) and MIO testbed. These “plug and play” experiment 
venues extends from NPS to Camp Roberts (California), the San Francisco Bay Area, 
Fort Eustis (Virginia), and the port authority areas of New York and New Jersey. These 
venues are connected via CENETIX’s VPN to key experts at various centers of 
excellence in the USA and overseas [53]. CENETIX fields several tools that facilitate 
experiment execution and enhance the flow of data through network nodes. Users are 
able to communicate with each other via video-conferencing and text chat applications, 
and share video, voice, and data files through the Observers Notepad tool. Pictures of 
CENETIX tools, the CENETIX backbone (San Francisco Bay and Camp Roberts in 





Figure 30.   CENETIX tools (Image from CENETIX website) 
 
 
Figure 31.   The CENETIX backbone: San Francisco Bay (left), Camp Roberts (right) 




Figure 32.   CENETIX Observers Notepad (Image from CENETIX website) 
Since 2004, NPS, with the cooperation of LLNL, the United States Coast Guard, 
first responders in San Francisco Bay, New York, and New Jersey under the Department 
of Homeland Security, and USA federal and international academic and military agencies 
(e.g., NMIOTC and FOI), has conducted a series of TNT/MIO experiments. The main 
scopes of these experiments are: (1) network performance, (2) advanced sensors and 
collaborative technology assessment, (3) the detectability of CBRNE material, and (4) the 
establishment and preservation of ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications via 
tactical wireless network connectivity. The results yield high quality cooperation between 
command-and-control (C2) organizations and expert centers on a worldwide scale for the 
rapid detection, identification, and proper response of CBRNE threats in various 
geographical areas [54]. For the execution of these TNT/MIO experiments, systems such 
as sensors, vessels, UAVs, and USVs have been extensively used alongside actual 
security operators, and facilitated by off-the-shelf and specifically designed CENETIX 
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tools. TNT/MIO experiments have already taken place in San Francisco Bay, port 
authority areas of New York and New Jersey, riverine areas in Virginia, at the NMIOTC 
in Greece, and various locales in Germany, Poland and Sweden. Some of those 
experiments and the lessons learned during their execution are discussed below.  
B. SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 
The experimental mesh network of the SFPD in the San Francisco Bay Area is 
intended to monitor Bay Area maritime traffic and disseminate sensor data and 
coordination communications (e.g., video conferencing and voice transmissions) for the 
radioactive-material detection mission conducted from nodes on operating SFPD boats 
and stationary nodes (see page 11) to expert centers connected to this network. Next, the 
employment of patrolling marine boats (see Figures 15 and 34) from the Coast Guard and 
the SFPD—with simultaneous integration of network - enabled detection and 
classification by reach-back to experts — took place for the first time in 2010, during the 
TNT/MIO 10–2 experiment [55]. Since then, the San Francisco Bay mesh network has 
been a significant part of TNT/MIO 11–2 and 12–2 experiments and is characterized as 
long-term because its execution expands, usually on a weekly basis or more frequently 
throughout the year, compared to other portions of TNT/MIO experiments that last only a 
few days.  
1. Network equipment 
The SFPD mesh network utilizes the Wave Relay ad-hoc networking system 
provided by Persistent Systems, LLC. The infrastructure of the mesh network uses two 
man-portable units, GEN4 (MPU4) and GEN3 (MPU3), the quad radio router, and the 
sector-antenna array, as depicted in Figures 33 and 34. The quad radio router is 
interconnected with the 5-GHz sector antenna-array system. This antenna is 
omnidirectional with a high gain value. Due to its significant vertical beam, it provides 
robust connectivity between naturally unstable network nodes, like those deployed for 
maritime operations [56]. 
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Figure 33.   Wave Relay equipment (Image from Persistent Systems website) 
 
Figure 34.   Sector Antenna Array onboard SFPD boat. 
More specifically, Wave Relay technology is a highly evolved and flexible 
MANET solution, able to adjust to terrain irregularities and environmental conditions that 
tend to degrade wireless network performance. Wave Relay based MANETs provide 
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connectivity enhancement that preserve communication among the network’s mobile 
nodes. The routing algorithm that Wave Relay uses allows a significant number of 
meshed-device to be dynamically incorporated into the network. Wave Relay’s system 
provides sufficient connectivity changes among the nodes during the network operation 
and is able to retrieve, with the use of a routing protocol, alternative pathways for 
connectivity preservation. A significant advantage of this technology is the network’s 
rapid scalability (consisting of a large number of mobile nodes)—a significant 
requirement for MIO and regional security networks. The Wave Relay technology is able 
to perceive node movement through the network – movement that causes network 
performance and connectivity fluctuations – and to route the data traffic via the current 
highest capacity path, thereby ensuring the best possible information flow and 
dissemination through the network [57].  
Due to its peer-to-peer routing, the Wave Relay nodes can communicate directly 
with each other without the need of relays through an Internet gateway. Wave Relay 
provides the network with fault tolerance, resulting in the continuous functionality of the 
network, since there is no single node that the network relies on to transfer data. 
Independent of the potential failure of a node, the network maintains its operation. This 
continuous functionality is achieved through multichannel devices that ensure routing via 
alternative channels, multiple routes for increased reliability, and utilization of multiple 
redundant paths for system connectivity [57].  
The MPU4 supports peer-to-peer network topology, multiple video streams 
through the network, and real-time position location and serial data transmission to 
participating network nodes. With the high data bandwidth that it uses, it is able to 
provide up to 37 Mbps of throughput. The MPU4 supports voice (up to sixteen press-to-
talk (PTT) channels), video, and data communications. To provide real-time position 
information, it is connected to the GPS. Location information is then transmitted over the 
network where monitoring/visualization is displayed via the Google Earth application. 
The MPU4’s effective range with the use of an omnidirectional antenna is approximately 
two nautical miles. The MPU4 uses high-density lithium-ion rechargeable batteries that 
allow it to operate up to fourteen hours. Its average power consumption is four Watts, 
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with peaks of eighteen Watts. There are seven editions of MPU4, classified by their 
operational frequency, which fluctuates (with specific bandwidths) from 700 MHz to 5.9 
GHz. MPU4, due to its convenient dimensions, can be wearable, an attribute necessary 
for SOF teams that may operate during MIO [58].  
The MPU3, as well as the MPU4, is designed for a human to carry and for 
permanent mounting on assets (e.g., UAVs, vehicles etc.). It provides with the data flow, 
from and to it, real-time SA, tactical voice (up to sixteen PTT channels), video, and data 
link. The MPU3 has an integrated GPS receiver to provide real-time position location 
and, similar to MPU4, it is able to provide up to 37 Mbps of throughput at an effective 
range of two miles with its omnidirectional antenna. Its peak transmission power is 2 
Watts. The MPU3 can be either battery powered or cable powered by 8–48 VDC. Its 
average power consumption is 4 Watts. The operation frequency depends on the edition 
and fluctuates between 700 MHz and 5 GHz [59]. 
The quad radio router ensures deployment flexibility, fault tolerance, and network 
scalability. It can support up to four wireless radios that all take place in routing and can 
be mounted. Its power consumption is approximately 16 Watts and it is cable (either to 
battery or other power source) power supplied. Like the MPU4 and MPU3, it has an 
integrated GPS receiver and provides up to 37 Mbps of throughput. It is interconnected 
with the sector antenna array to communicate with the other nodes. The quad radio router 
with sector antenna array constitutes the sector antenna array router that is mounted on 
the SFPD patrol boats. The system operates at 5 GHz (there is also an edition that 
operates at 2.4 GHz) and its theoretical effective range is around ten miles (line of sight). 
According to the Persistent Systems’ specification sheet for the sector antenna array 
router, it has been tested at 8.5 miles delivering 8.5 Mbps of throughput. The array 
consists of three independent antennas, each one with 120o coverage, that combine to 
provide high gain (10 dBi x 3 sectors) 360o horizontal coverage. Because of the 
significant vertical beam, a wide vertical area is covered too. With the use of the three 




capacity augmentation are achieved since the RF signals are directed toward the 
destination. This particular attribute ameliorates system reception as well ensuring the 
nodes connection [60], [61].  
In addition to the Wave Relay systems (Quad Radio Router with Sector Antenna) 
for the TNT MIO experiments, the SFPD boats (Marine 2 and Marine 3) are equipped 
with the ARAM sensor presented in Chapter III (Figure 10) for the detection of 
radiological material, and with a video camera for picture transmission through the 
network. Aboard each patrol boat is a laptop that interconnects all systems and uses some 
of the CENETIX SA tools. Through the use of the laptop, the user onboard can be aware 
of the network status (e.g., which nodes are connected) through the node-ping graph (see 
Figure 35), transmit and receive video, and use Observer’s Notepad to communicate with 
other nodes by text chat, uploading files (e.g., voice, video, and data) and transmitting the 
spectral data derived by ARAM sensor detections. The spectral data as appears on a 
laptop screen is depicted in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 35.   Node-Ping Graph 
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Figure 36.     Spectral diagram of ARAM as seen on laptop screen onboard SFPD boat 
The Golden Gate Bridge (GGB) node is equipped, apart from the Wave Relay 
Quad Radio Router with Sector Antenna, with a camera, continuously monitoring the 
traffic in the vicinity, and is remotely controlled via the CENETIX VPN. The relay node 
at the Coast Guard Yacht Club (CGYC), which was initially placed on Pier 45 in San 
Francisco Port (see Figures (3), (28)), provides meteorological data to the network. The 
overall performance and status of the network is monitored by the CENETIX NOC in 
NPS.  
2. TNT/MIO 11–2 (May 6, 2011, event) 
The TNT/MIO 10–2 experiment conducted in 2010 entailed the first use of the 
SFPD patrol boats (Marine 2 and 3. The San Francisco Bay portion of both the 10–2 and 
TNT/MIO 11–2 experiment included the participation of the USCG, SFPD, and Alameda 
and Contra Costa county sheriffs’ patrol boats. The main scopes of those experiments 
were the following: 
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• Familiarization of boarding teams with SA sharing. 
• Exchange of real-time video and information with the Health 
Department’s radiological experts. 
• Small boat with mounted sensor search pattern effectiveness testing (i.e., 
testing which drive-by patterns were most effective in detecting 
radiological materials on a queue of pleasure craft). 
• Network connectivity limitations due to range (e.g., in the case that the 
target vessels location causes the boarding team to operate at the limits of 
the network coverage). 
• Tracking of patrol vessels through position-location information (PLI) 
based on GPS–Google Earth tool network monitoring. 
• Generation of alerts and spectra reception by NPS, LLNL, and expert 
centers [38]. 
• ARAM sensor performance according to the radiological source location 
(distance and height) onboard the vessel. 
• Examination of motion and sea-state effect on detector performance. 
As part of TNT/MIO 11–2, a San Francisco Bay experiment took place on May 
06, 2011. During this event, one SFPD boat was employed and a Trellis Ware TW-220 
CheetahNet radio was integrated for testing with the Wave Relay system onboard the 
patrol boat. The test explored voice and data communications from a moving vessel to a 
shore node (NPS in this case) [20]. The TW-220 CheetahNet, according to Trellis Ware 
technologies website, is a wideband, networking radio that is able to support voice, video 
and data communications, and PLI simultaneously. It provides scalability and it is 
completely self-configuring. The TW-220 can provide data rates up to 2 Mbps and 
support up to eight hops among the nodes of an ad-hoc network. Its transmission 
frequency fluctuates between 905–925 MHz and also between 1775–1815 MHz with 
transmission output power of approximately 2 Watts [62]. A picture of TW-220 
CheetahNet radio is depicted in Figure 37.  
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Figure 37.   TW-220 CheetahNet radio (Image from TrellisWare website) 
The aim of this experiment was achieved: PLI was visible at the shore station. 
The itinerary that the SFPD boat followed was depicted on GPS–Google Earth tracking 
tool. Live-streaming video was transmitted from the boat (Figure 38) to NPS. The crew 
onboard the patrol boat uploaded ARAM sensor-detection data on the Observer Notepad 
application making the spectra visible at the remote NPS node (fig. 36). The patrol-boat’s 








Figure 39.   SFPD patrol boat PLI (Image from CENETIX website) 
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3. TNT/MIO 12–2 (February 28, 2012 event) 
The TNT/MIO experiment continues in the San Francisco Bay Area in 2012. This 
portion of TNT/MIO 12–2 is taking place throughout the year on a weekly basis and with 
the same aim as TNT/MIO 11–2. For TNT/MIO 12–2 and the NPS Department of 
Information Sciences’’ course on telecommunications and NOCs (IS4926), an NPS 
student team, including the author, participated both on the scene aboard SFPD patrol 
boats, and remotely from network operations centers at NPS’s CENETIX lab and Camp 
Roberts. In February 2012, tests of network-management techniques for the TNT/MIO 
mesh network were conducted to comprehend network capabilities and performance. 
During this experiment, two SFPD patrol boats (Marine 2 and Marine 3) were employed. 
The main scope of this event was testing the hardware and software operations aboard the 
patrol boats that enabled the NPS CENETIX NOC to receive ARAM-detection 
measurements and live-streaming video derived by the boats’ cameras. Node behavior 
and cluster overall performance was captured.  
The team aboard the two patrol boats checked the network behavior and status 
through the node-ping graph on the boats’ laptop screens (Figure (35)). The SFPD boats 
were connected with the NPS CENETIX NOC through the GGB node (Figure (3)). 
Information exchange and co-ordination between the boats themselves and the NOCs was 
achieved with the use of Observer’s Notepad. Observer’s Notepad was used for 
information exchange regarding network and node status, directions by the NOCs, and 
ARAM-detection data uploading. One insoluble problem was the malfunction of Marine 
2’s camera, resulting in video streaming only from Marine 3 through the VC1 
conferencing application during the trial. As long as the patrol boats were connected to 
the GGB node, there was PLI through the GPS–Google Earth tool. The boat routes are 
depicted in Figure 40: with the blue line is for Marine 2 and the green line is Marine 3. 




Figure 40.   PLI of Marine 2 (blue) and Marine 3 (green) during February 28, 2012, trial 
Figure 40 shows that for part of the trial, Marine 2 was disconnected from the 
network because of technical problems. Once these problems were addressed, there was 
connectivity throughout the rest of trial. Initially, the two boats transited to a location 
north of the GGB node that is known, from previous experiments, to receive a strong 
signal level from the GGB node. During the transit and while on station there, live video 
streaming from Marine 3 (Figure 41) and ARAM-detection spectra uploading through 
Observer’s Notepad were successful. Prior to arrival at this position, Marine 2 was not 
able to connect to the network. After fixing this problem, the network’s overall status as 
captured by the NPS NOC through “Solar Winds”7 network monitoring is depicted in 
Figure 42. The green circles indicate successfully operating connections, and the red 
circles indicate no connection to the network. As depicted, the Marine 2 video has a red 
circle since it never worked during this trial.  
 
                                                 
7 Network performance and general network management is based on the network performance 
monitoring software tool provided by Solarwinds Inc.  
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Figure 41.   Live video streaming from Marine 3 
 
 
Figure 42.   Network status on “Solar Winds” platform 
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After staying at the north side of the GGB, the two boats were directed to move to 
the vicinity of Alcatraz Island. This area is experimentally proven to have low signal 
coverage from the communications nodes. The goal of this movement was a network-
status check with one mobile node inside and the other outside the GGB node coverage 
area. Marine 2 moved to the weak or no coverage area and Marine 3 remained around 0.5 
nautical miles behind to maintain connectivity with the GGB node. Observations showed 
that Marine 3 preserved its connectivity while sailing close to the Alcatraz area because 
Marine 2 was the intermediate node between Marine 3 and the GGB, relaying 
interactively the data (multi-hop). The team aboard the patrol vessels checked node status 
during this phase with the node-ping graph on their laptop screens; however, without 
having any indication for data relay or not. The data rate gauged from Marine 2 during 
the aforementioned phase was approximately 3.4 Kbps for uploading and 125 Kbps for 




Figure 43.   Bandwidth Monitor on Solar Winds platform  
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4. Lessons learned 
During the San Francisco Bay portion of the TNT/MIO experiments, the potential 
contribution of ad-hoc sensor networks to MIO and regional security operations is 
obvious. Most importantly, data that leads to achieving SA of complex events is 
disseminated throughout the network with the use of man and small vessel/craft 
transportable equipment (i.e.; relatively small and light weight), such as Wave Relay and 
Trellis Ware radios. These systems allow for the delivery of information around the 
participating nodes and to expert centers via VPN connections through the commercial 
Internet. The use of the commercial Internet is only a surrogate for likely military or other 
official government or alliance networks. Additionally, PLI from the patrol boats, or any 
asset capable of transporting a node, can be provided to the end node. Hence, these 
systems allow the flow of human communications, both voice and text, real-time video, 
still pictures, detailed sensor data from sensors about the presence of illicit material, and 
the material’s exact location onboard a suspicious vessel.  
It is clear that mobile nodes—in this particular case, the patrol boats— have to 
maneuver promptly to retain direct or indirect connectivity to enable the flow of 
information. This situation can be applied as well to boarding teams and other mobile 
assets, as described in Chapter III. When a node is operating in a low- or no-coverage 
area, the employment of a relay node ensures the smooth flow of data, as shown in the 
February 2012 events. 
During the experiment’s execution, detector performance was affected, though 
not dramatically, by the sensor’s proximity to the radiological sources, the motion of the 
two boats, and source’s strength. Moreover, LOS is a critical factor for connectivity 
preservation. For example, the boats, when berthed in the San Francisco Port cannot be 
connected to the network, since the GGB node is out of their LOS. Furthermore, since the 
mesh-network environment is a non-constant variable (e.g., due to potential position 
alterations) that affects overall performance in the establishment of local NOCs in nodes, 
like the respective on SFPD boats that are giving information about the cluster nodes 
status, provides the network with added flexibility and adaptation. However, the 
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adaptation of local NOCs does not require a central NOC replacement, since the central 
NOC is responsible for all network monitoring and actions in case of a situation that 
affects the network operation.   
C. FORT EUSTIS – RIVERINE AREA, VIRGINIA  
To better understand and exploit ad-hoc sensor networking in MIOs, experiments 
have been conducted with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and in the 
riverine area of the James River adjacent to Fort Eustis, Virginia [56]. The following 
experiments were conducted as portions of TNT/MIO 08-04, TNT/MIO 9-2, and 
TNT/MIO 9-4. 
1. TNT/MIO 08–04 Experiment (September 08–12, 2008) 
The TNT/MIO 08–04 took place between September 8th and 12th, 2008 and was 
divided in two portions. The first was conducted in ports under the cognizance of the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey on September 8 and 9, and the second was 
executed in the riverine area of Hamptons Roads. The scope of this experiment was the 
exploration of new sensors, networking, and SA solutions that could contribute to 
detection, interdiction, and tracking of ships and boats that may pose a radiological threat 
in coastal, populated areas. The experiment included cooperation and data sharing with a 
node in Sweden. The equipment used to create the ship-to-shore wireless networks was 
Wave Relay. A total of eighteen Wave Relay devices (three were man-portable) were 
used on both mobile and stationary nodes during the New York portion of the 
experiment. The networks were integrated into a satellite communications (SATCOM) 
system at the port authority’s emergency-operations center, to provide Internet 
connectivity to reach-back centers in California, across the USA. This replicated 
conditions likely found in austere areas were public Internet access is unavailable. This 
satellite-to-ad-hoc network enabled mobile tactical nodes (e.g., Wave Relay systems 
mounted on boats and a UAV) to provide live-streaming video and other information 
transmissions to strategic nodes. [56] 
The New York–New Jersey portion included two phases. During the first phase, 
boarding operations and searching for radiological material on a “suspicious” vessel were 
 77 
conducted. During the second phase, detection of illicit material aboard two small vessels 
in a harbor was conducted by patrols with radiological detection systems onboard. In both 
phases, the participants, acting as investigators, needed to transmit in real time SA and 
spectral information to all centers (e.g., emergency operations centers and centers of 
excellence for radiological incidents). During the first phase, the boarding team managed 
to detect the radiation source and transmit the spectra to the expert centers through the 
network. They also transmitted live streaming video to assist in evaluation the spectra. 
Moreover, information sharing through the Observer’s Notepad was continuous. 
Simultaneously, a UAV successfully transmitted aerial video of the suspicious vessel 
[56]. A snapshot of the video streams from the boarding team onboard the suspect vessel 
and the UAV is depicted in Figure 44. 
  
 
Figure 44.   Live video streaming from boarding team (left) and UAV (right) (Image 
from CENETIX website) 
During the second phase, the moving small security vessels used Wave Relay 
equipment to form a mesh network to transmit SA, video, and sensor detection data. The 
boats during this phase were moving in a coordinated manner in order to maintain 
connectivity and data transmission to the SATCOM node. This was accomplished by 
using the multi-hop capability by assigning a boat to act as a communication relay node. 
The patrol boats succeeded in intercepting the suspicious vessel that was carrying a 
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radiologic source, and had that source properly and expeditiously identifies by a remote 
expert based on the real time transmission of spectra files and video [56]. 
The second portion of the experiment took place in a riverine area of Virginia. 
The scope of the riverine scenario was the testing of wireless-networking support of high 
speed small-boat interdiction, waterborne-radiation detection, and data dissemination 
(e.g., video, SA, radiological) for security-operations. During the riverine phase, 
connectivity between two nodes was achieved at a distance of more than seven nautical 
miles. There were tests at this distance between the tactical-operation center (TOC) node 
and a remote semi-fixed node (i.e., the node was temporarily set up on a tripod to act as a 
deployable relay node to extend the network around a nearby bend in the river) set up on 
an adjacent riverbank. This set up was designed to measure the performance of this LOS 
link using different kinds of antennas. For sector-antenna array to sector-antenna array 
trail, the throughput was 8 to 10 Mbps. The 23 dB-directional-panel antenna to sector-
antenna array yielded a throughput of 17 to 20 Mbps, and with the connection through 
two directional-panel antennas, the throughput reached 33 Mbps. Using the multi-hop 
effect, data was disseminated at a distance of fourteen nautical miles. The Google Earth 
visualization showed the TOC the boat positions and the link status between them. 
Furthermore, the network performance was tested while the boats were operating at high 
speeds. The Wave Relay nodes on the maneuvering boats were able to maintain live 
streaming video connectivity with no degradation, even when the small boats were 
operating at forty knots and experiencing significant turbulence on the water [56]. 
During the first day of the riverine experiment, two boats acted as boarding 
vessels and two others played the targets. The boarding vessels transmitted video and 
radiation spectra from the targets. Also during the boarding phase, biometric data was 
obtained from the crew of the target vessel and successfully transmitted to expert centers. 
On the second day, connectivity under high mobility conditions was tested along with 
radiation sensor performance, and spectra and biometric data dissemination through the 
network. The boat to shore connection reach out to seven nautical miles direct-distance, 
and fourteen nautical miles distance with one boat acting as a relay node—see Figure 45 




Figure 45.   Riverine-area mesh network (From [56]) 
The aims of the TNT/MIO experiments in New York/New Jersey and Virginia 
were accomplished. There was robust communication, exploitation of Wave Relay 
systems among vessels and a UAV in multiple security situations. The nodes managed to 
transmit through the network live video, SA information, voice and text data, and 
radioactive source spectra files in real time to remote expert centers even at while 
conducting high speed operation—like those often occurring in security missions. Also 
the use of relay nodes proved that network coverage can be significantly increased, as in 
the case of fourteen-nautical-mile connectivity with multi-hop exploitation. Moreover, 
results showed that the use of a high-gain antenna, like that of Wave Relay systems, can 
dramatically affect network performance at a given distance.  
2. TNT/MIO 09–02 Experiment (April 23–24, 2009) 
The experiments in the riverine area continued in 2009. The riverine portion of 
TNT/MIO 09–02 took place between April 23rd and 24th, 2009. During this experiment, 
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a mobile operation base (MOB) was formed by a patrol boat that brought networked 
swimmers into the area. The mission of the swimmers was to tag a target vessel for vessel 
monitoring. Additionally, personnel-detection sensors and video cameras connected to 
Wave Relay devices were place on the riverbank along the target vessel’s expected route 
to detect illicit activities (e.g., smuggling items or people to or from the target boat). 
These sensors can detect individuals at ten to twenty feet. When the sensors are 
approached by swimmers, they are triggered and transmit alerts through the SA 
application to local MOBs, TOCs, and other observation sites connected to the network. 
During this experiment, live streaming from patrol boats, Google Earth PLI, and 
Observer’s Notepad were used. A remarkable fact during this experiment was the 
employment of the USV Sea Fox, which was remotely controlled from a ground station 
and used to chase the target vessel while transmitting live video streaming (Figure 46) 




Figure 46.   USV Sea Fox video streaming (Image from CENETIX website) 
A remarkable outcome during this experiment was the achievement of ship-to-
shore connectivity at a distance of 13.16 nautical miles with the use of two boats and 
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their peer-to-peer-mesh nodes (Figure 47), as well with the maintaining of connectivity 
while operating at high speeds of around 30 knots. 
 
 
Figure 47.   Riverine network connectivity at 12.4 nm (Image from CENETIX website)  
3. TNT/MIO 09–04 (September 09–10, 2009) 
The Fort Eustis portion of TNT/MIO 09–04 experiment took place on September 
09–10, 2009. During this experiment, cooperation between MOBs and USVs for 
surveillance and detection was examined, as well with stand-off detection of illicit 
material at high speed and dissemination of SA through the network on a worldwide 
scale. During the Fort Eustis portion, there was collaboration with the Swedish naval 
warfare center in Karlskrona, Sweden. This cooperation included the control of the USV 
feed between the two locations. The control signals were passed over the network. 
During this experiment two Sea Fox USVs were employed and motion detection and 
video sensors were placed ashore for the detection of swimmers in a particular area. With 
the activation of sensors, alerts were transmitted through the network to the MOB and 
TOC [63]. 
 82 
A key research point during this experiment was the sensing ability of a sensor in 
proportion to speed and distance from the resource. Initially, with the employment of one 
vessel as sensor carrier and another as source carrier, a sensing distance of 104 ft. at a 
speed of 4.9 knots was achieved. During the experiment’s evolution, a sensing distance of 
75 ft at a speed of 58 knots was reached. At this distance and speed, there was a 100% 
success rate of illicit material detection by the sensor. The initial measurement array 
through PLI tool and the ARAM spectra diagram are depicted in Figure 48, with ME1 
being the patrol boat and ME2 the target vessel [63].  
 
  
Figure 48.   Sensing distance measurement between ME1 and ME2 and ARAM spectra 
diagram (Image from CENETIX website) 
The video transmission from nodes placed ashore whose sensors were triggered 
by swimmers is depicted in Figure 49. With the employment of these sensor nodes, live 





Figure 49.   Swimmer detection by ashore node (Image from CENETIX website) 
4. Lessons learned 
During the TNT/MIO experiment portions of the riverine and New York/New 
Jersey port area, the feasibility of live video transmission from UAVs of boarding teams 
during embarkation was explored. Especially when the boarding team was aboard the 
suspicious vessel, connectivity was preserved, even though in some case there was no 
LOS communication between the boarding team and other network nodes. This fact had 
to do with the transmitted signal reflection on the “seized” ship containers which were 
intermediated through the LOS between the boarding team and other nodes. This 
connectivity contributed to the transmission of live video streaming and sensor detection, 
proving that communication between network nodes can be achieved even out of LOS, 
depending on the intervening material surface. Moreover, the contribution of high-gain 
antennas to connectivity and data-rate increases was more than obvious. As in the San 
Francisco Bay experiments, in riverine trials the presence of relay nodes expanded 
network coverage significantly, with the multi-hop capabilities ensuring data 
dissemination (video, sensor data, etc.) through the network. Furthermore, it was made 
clear that standoff detection of radioactive material with simultaneous data transmission 
from the sensor node at high speeds is more than feasible. The employment of sensors 
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that detected the presence and movement of swimmers from shore while transmitting live 
video to MOB and other centers shows how this kind of network can contribute to 
security operations.   
D. NMIOTC, SOUDA BAY - GREECE 
TNT/MIO experiments in 2009, occurred at the NMIOTC in Souda Bay, Greece. 
Since then, NMIOTC is an integral part of the annual TNT/MIO experiments. These 
experiments include participation of NPS and several other NATO and international 
organizations responsible for national or allied security. During NMIOTC experiments, 
there was exploitation of networked tactical swimmers, standoff detection of radioactive 
material by a UAV, large-vessel searches, and SA reach-back to expert centers on the 
network. 
1. TNT/MIO 09-04 (September 28–30, 2009) 
The first time NMIOTC participated in TNM/MIO experiments was during 
TNT/MIO 09-04, September 28–30, 2009. During this experiment, there was utilization 
of ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore broadband mesh networking. Over that mesh network 
the following actions were taken: (1) SA information was transmitted to the NMIOTC 
main building and to a moored training ship (see Figure 50), (2) GSM/GPRS was 
networked with swimmers, (3) security patrol and target vessels acted as network nodes, 
and (4) radiation sensors data was transmitted from two patrol vessels acting as a 
checkpoint (i.e., a chokepoint or portal that suspect vessels had to pass between). The 
Wave Relay systems were used for ship-to-shore connectivity (operating at 5.8 GHz and 
2.4 GHz), as well as for networking along the deck of the training ship and providing 
ship-to-ship wireless-mesh networking. Cameras, vessel GPS-based tags, and ARAM 
sensor were also employed [63].  
One of the research objectives was to conduct a large-vessel search by a boarding 
team, and to use networked swimmers to search for and detect IEDs on the hull. The 
boarding team sought illicit material aboard ship and identified each cache with portable 
ARAM sensors. The boarding team was equipped with Firestorm GPS-denial navigation 
systems while operating inside the training vessel (i.e., in internal compartments under 
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the superstructure) where there was no GPS coverage. With the use of Firestorm, the 
location of the boarding team and the data retrieved by the sensors were viewable through 
the SA tools by the expert centers at NMIOTC, NPS, and LLNL. The large vessel for 
experiment was the former HS ARIS (A-74, see Figure 50) berthed in Souda Bay for 
NMIOTC training purposes. It is 130 meters long [63]. 
 
 
Figure 50.   Large vessel: HS ARIS at NMIOTC 
To check for the possibility of ship-mounted IEDs, searches were performed by 
swimmers connected to the network. A simulated IED was placed on the hull of the 
ARIS. Apart from IED detection, the swimmers were tasked to inform the TOC and MOB 
if they detected the presence of a “suspicious” small vessel in the area, and then covertly 
place a tracking tag on it that could be tracked over the network. Additionally, the 
swimmers placed sensors ashore according to the expected itinerary of suspicious 
vessels; this was similar the riverine experiment. The swimmers carried tracking devices 
(GPS with GSM/GPRS connection) to allow the centers to be aware of each swimmer’s 
position, IED-detection devices simulated by a Bluetooth-based proximity detector, and 
waterproof voice-communications equipment. During the IED detection phase, the 
swimmers, after finding the IED with the Bluetooth proximity detector, relayed 
photographs from their support boats to the TOC for further evaluation [63]. A snapshot 





Figure 51.   Swimmer positions on PLI and a picture taken on the vessel 
hull (From [63]) 
As in the riverine experiment, a small-craft standoff detection and interdiction 
was achieved during the TNT/MIO 09–4 NMIOTC experiment. Two patrol boats 
equipped with a RN sensor were able to transmit detection and SA data in real time 
through the network using the Observer’s Notepad tool. During the standoff detection 
tests, it was revealed that a narrow portal—approximately 20 feet wide—was required to 
detect sources when suspect boats passed through the portal at high speed (i.e., 25 knots 
and more). Also, to facilitate data sharing with the TOC during this phase, one patrol boat 
acted as a relay communication node between the other portal boat and the TOC. 
2. TNT/MIO 10-02 (June 12–14, 2010) 
In 2010, NMIOTC participated in the TNT/MIO 10–2 experiment between June 
12th and 14th. The first part of TNT/MIO 10-02 was conducted in Germany from June 
7th to the 10th. The scope of TNT/MIO 10-02 was to more precisely examine: (1) ad-hoc 
mobile-networking architectures that employ handheld and unmanned, systems-based 
detectors, (2) the information-management architecture for SA sharing (e.g., sharing 
alerts on threats posed by a small vessel), (3) monitoring of vessels that carry illicit 
material in open waters by tracking movement through SA tools, and (4) standoff 
detection of illicit material at high speeds with sensor carrying USVs and UAVs. As in 
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the case of the TNT/MIO 09–04 experiment, networking with swimmers, sensor 
operators, and patrol boats providing reach-back to expert centers for identification of 
illicit material was achieved. The equipment used was the Wave Relay system solution 
operating at 5.8 and 2.4 Ghz for ship-to-shore and Wave Relay system solution of the 
ship-to-ship, on the move, broadband wireless-mesh network. For the monitoring of 
targets, GSM and satellite-based location posters (i.e., active tags) were utilized [55].  
As mentioned above, the experiment employed network-enabled swimmers to 
detect a small craft carrying illicit material. The swimmers were integrated into the ad-
hoc, mobile, ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore mesh network. That connection allowed them 
to receive video feeds on the suspicious object. An NMIOTC patrol vessel acted as a 
MOB that was tasked to find the suspicious boat and identify potential threats to the base. 
The networked swimmers transmitted information about the illicit object orally and by 
video, which was relayed afterwards to detection experts at the reach-back location. The 
swimmer positions during this particular procedure were depicted on the PLI tool. The 
video feed from the swimmers to the NMIOTC Headquarters simulated the experiment 
reach-back center. Figure 52 shows the positions of the patrol boats and the swimmers as 
depicted on the PLI tool. After the object was evaluated by the expert center, the 
swimmers tagged the target vessels with a network node that ensured target position 
monitoring [55].  
 
 
Figure 52.   Swimmer video feed and positions on PLI (Image from CENETIX website) 
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After the swimmers’ task was completed, a small craft with an RN source 
onboard was used explore the efficacy of standoff detection on the move. The sensor on a 
patrol boat first alerted on the source at a distance of 100 ft; however, the expert centers 
were unable to identify the threat. The centers recommended closing to 50 ft, and then 20 
ft, but neither distance produced satisfactory RN sensor data to identify the threat. Next, a 
standoff detection test was conducted by a RN equipped UAV Vellerofontis mini-
helicopter (see Figure 24). The Vellerofontis was also equipped with a camera that 
allowed video streaming through the network. The UAV, controlled by its separate radio 
control link, achieved aerial detections of the source from above the target vessel. This 
sensor data was sufficient to allow source identification by the experts receiving feed 
from the helicopter [55]. The detection-spectra diagram and video streaming during 
Vellerofontis’s flight is depicted in Figure 53.  
 
 
Figure 53.   UAV standoff detection results (Images provided by NMIOTC) 
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The most significant outcome of the NMIOTC portion of the TNT/MIO 10–02 
experiment was the success of standoff aerial detection and identification of illicit 
material by the UAV, with simultaneous SA data dissemination through the network. 
This success provides unambiguous facts that UAVs are capable of providing valuable 
support to MIO sensor networks, an alternative, valuable tool for the success of MIO 
missions to interdict RN materials. It must be kept in mind that this particular UAV’s 
speed when fully loaded with sensors and communication systems was nearly 100 km/h 
and its range was around three nautical miles. That range limitation was due to the non-
networked, LOS radio control signal from the UAV’s ground station to the UAV. 
3. TNT/MIO 11–02 (June 9–10, 2011) 
The NMIOTC portion of TNT/MIO 11–02 experiment took place in Souda Bay, 
Greece between June 9th and 10th of 2011. Generally, the research areas of this 
experiment in its totality, including the San Francisco Bay Area network, were: 
• Integration of boarding teams to ad-hoc mobile networking architectures. 
• Information management architectures to share alerts on CBRNE threats 
found onboard crafts. 
• Surveillance methods for locating, tagging, and tracking of vessels 
suspected of carrying CBRNE materials. 
• Exploitation of USVs and UAVs for standoff detection at high speeds 
• Uncovering potential vulnerabilities of these ad-hoc sensor networks [38] 
 The main scope of this experiment at NMIOTC was threats tracking integration, 
CBRNE threats detection, and interdiction of maritime threats in the vicinity of a naval 
base. There following capabilities were investigated: (1) networked-enabled tactical 
swimmers for tagging suspect vessels and threat detection aboard a small craft, (2) 
cooperation between swimmers and boarding teams, (3) communication with expert 
centers for a network-controlled chokepoint establishment and (4) standoff detection 
during a high-speed chase. The swimmers provided the boarding teams with descriptions 
of parasite boxes (i.e., suspected IEDs), target data, etc., and also provided the boarding 
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team with spectra files obtained by their portal sensor (see Figure 13) via USB drives, 
since direct dissemination through the network, as initially planned, was not feasible. 
These spectra were disseminated through the network to expert centers by manually 
posting on Observer’s Notepad. Furthermore, during this experiment a USV with a 
source onboard was used to simulate a target vessel posing a threat to a naval base. The 
mini-helicopter Vellerofontis was used to conduct standoff detection at high speed and 
disseminate radiation detections and live video streams of the threat through the network 
[38].  
The NMIOTC portion of TNT/MIO 11–02 was divided into four phases. In the 
first phase, there was simulation of early detection and interdiction of suspect vessel in 
the Baltic Sea close to Karlksrona harbor. This information was used at NMIOTC in 
follow-up classification when the source was detected in Souda Bay. During the second 
phase of the experiment, a large-vessel (HS ARIS) was searched by networked swimmers 
carrying portable sensors and relaying SA data through the network. In the third phase, 
small craft tracking, detection, and search were executed. A USV was used to simulate a 
small manned boat. The fourth phase was the same as the third, but instead of the USV, a 
small manned vessel was employed [38].  
After the first-phase (i.e., the simulated of early detection of a suspicious vessel 
and source), transition to live experimentation was conducted. During the second phase, 
the networked swimmers were deployed around the large vessel to execute their 
assignment, transmitting video feed to the video-conference tool via cameras mounted on 
their helmets. A snapshot of the video-conferencing and swimmer deployment is depicted 
in Figures (12) and (14). The swimmers provided video and oral evaluation of their 
search and exchanged information with experts. On the other hand, the boarding team on 
the vessel received spectra detections from the swimmers through the mesh network and 
uploaded them to Observer’s Notepad to be seen and evaluated by the experts [38]. 
Detections by swimmers were conducted with the use of the portable detector depicted in 
Figure 13. The position of the swimmers was mapped with the PLI tool, is depicted in 




Figure 54.   Swimmers Location on PLI during large-vessel search (Image from 
CENETIX website) 
Apart from swimmer deployments, a boarding team embarked on the vessel to 
investigate for the presence of radioactive material inside the ship. For the transmission 
of voice, video, and sensor data from internal compartments below deck to the TOC at 
NMIOTC headquarters, TrellisWare radios were used. The network-performance 
statistics for throughput and latency, according to the location of the boarding team 
during this phase, are depicted in Figure 55. [20] 
 
 
Figure 55.   Network performance statistics during large-vessel search (From [20]) 
After the large-vessel search phase, small-craft detection and interdiction was 
executed. The distance between the target and patrol boat for standoff detection was 
reduced successively during this phase from 100 ft to 20 ft. Even though there were 
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detection alerts, the sensor’s data output was insufficient for the experts to identify the 
source material. The location of vessels was visible on the PLI tool. Each boat was 
connected to the mesh network with Wave Relay equipment; however, TrellisWare 
CheetahNet radios were also employed as an alternative network for voice 
communications among all boats and the MOC, and for video-streaming transmission 
from the boat in the observer’s role to the TOC. 
After unsuccessful attempts to identify the radiological source, the experiment 
proceeded to the next phase, which included USV and UAV employment. The USV, with 
the radioactive source onboard, was ejected by the target craft. The UAV conducted 
standoff detection of the source, chasing the USV at high speed, providing live video-
streaming, tracking, and sensor data to the experts through the mesh network [38]. A 
snapshot of the USV pursuit by the UAV and of the sensor data is depicted in Figure 56.  
 
 
Figure 56.   UAV–USV pursuit and sensor data (Images provided by NMIOTC) 
During this experiment portion the following tasks were achieved [38]: 
• Satellite reach-back to expert centers (e.g., NATO JCBRN COE)  
• Exploitation of ad-hoc broadband wireless-mesh network with patrol 
vessels and sensors as nodes 
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• Use of an additional mesh radio network for the boarding team (Trellis 
Ware) 
• Use of ad-hoc mobile, broadband, wireless-mesh network for the 
swimmers (Wave Relay) 
• Tracking with GSM and Globalstar Satellite network use.  
This experiment proved the significant contribution of ad-hoc sensor networks 
consisting of several types of nodes (vessels, UAV, swimmers, etc.) to MIO and how 
these networks can facilitate the detection, and rapid identification and evaluation of a 
threat by experts anywhere in the world through SATCOM communications network link 
reach-back. Diagrams of the experiment networks are depicted in Figures (57), (58), (59), 
retrieved from TNT/MIO 11–2 report. 
 
 
Figure 57.   Large-vessel search ad-hoc sensor network (From [38]) 
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Figure 58.   Small-vessel search ad-hoc sensor network (From [38]) 
 
Figure 59.   Swimmer ad-hoc mobile, broadband, wireless-mesh network (From [38]) 
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4. TNT/MIO 12–02 (June 12–14, 2012) 
The most recent experiment in NMIOTC was one of the two outside the USA 
portions (the first took place in Sweden and Poland) of TNT/MIO 12–02, which was 
conducted between June 12th and 14th, 2012. During the NMIOTC experiment, there 
was a large-vessel search by networked swimmers and boarding teams using portable 
sensors and mesh peer-to-peer networking. Apart from the large-vessel scenario, there 
were small-craft search phases, where a target vessel was simulated by a USV and their 
objectives were small-vessel detection and evaluation by swimmers, setup of primary and 
secondary chokepoints, and high-speed standoff detection and pursuit with UAV 
employment as executed in TNT/MIO 11–02. Finally, an experiment was conducted 
where the USV and UAV roles were reversed. The UAV mini-helicopter was used as the 
source carrier and detection was conducted by the surface vessel.  
The main scope of TNT/MIO 12–02 at NMIOTC was similar to TNT/MIO 11–02 
(see page 89). During this experiment, spectra data uploads were achieved through 
Observer’s Notepad, SA data dissemination of patrol and target vessel locations, and 
information exchange among participants (including the NPS NOC) via chatting and 
voice files upload through Observer’s Notepad and also via voice, video and video-
conference as in previous NMIOTC experiments. The evaluation of threats was 
conducted by the experts at NMIOTC and other locations, e.g., NATO JCBRN COE in 
the Czech Republic. Standoff detection of illicit material and data dissemination was 
achieved by a patrol vessel and a UAV. The mini-helicopter carrying the radioactive 
material conducted flights above the patrol boat, which was equipped with the sensor. 
Detections were achieved by the patrol boats when the mini-helicopter flew at a distance 
and height from the boats of ten meters and three meters, respectively. The quality of the 
detection allowed the experts who received the data to identify the material. 
Simultaneously, there was a live streaming-video transmission through the network by 
the camera on the UAV. The networking systems used were TrellisWare and Wave Relay 
systems, as in previous experiments. 
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5. Lessons learned 
Using actual NATO boarding crews from NMIOTC is one of the most significant 
parts of TNT/MIO experiments being held by USA and international organizations. The 
experiments conducted at NMIOTC proved once more the necessity and the contribution 
of ad-hoc sensor networks to MIO and regional security operations. The sensor network 
was designed and configured to provide high quality services such as video-conferencing, 
PLI tools, and detection of illicit material. The employment of networked swimmers 
constitutes a milestone for this kind of network, since swimmers can be used to approach 
suspicious objects at the surface or on a vessel’s hull and, with expert collaboration 
support, identify them through the exchange of video, sensor, and voice communications 
data. Apart from the employment of swimmers, the use of the mini-helicopter showed 
how UAVs can be utilized in MIO for flexible (i.e., they can more readily and rapidly 
position themselves) detection of CBRNE materials. The ability of UAVs to detect 
sources at high speeds and at some distance from the source carrier adds a valuable tool 
for the conduct of MIO. Furthermore, the plausible scenario during TNT/MIO 12–2 
showed that the detection and identification of CBRNE material approaching by air (with 
a UAV in this case) is feasible by surface means. This detection can be considered an 
early warning when a radioactive attack by air is imminent and can result in threat 
interdiction and destruction in a timely manner. The centers connected to the network 
were aware of tagged vessels movements, through the PLI tool, at all times, allowing 
interdiction when necessary. The communications equipment significantly facilitated 
attaining the experiments’ objectives: the Trellis Ware system contributed to the 
communication between the boarding team and headquarters while the Wave Relay 
systems facilitated node connection and data dissemination through the network. 
E. SUMMARY 
As described in this chapter, several experiments have been conducted on how ad-
hoc sensor networks can facilitate MIOs and regional security operations. The technology 
evolution and the adaptation of innovative means during the above-described experiments 
show clearly the capabilities of ad-hoc sensor networks to support these security and 
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interdiction operations. The employment of UAVs and swimmers/divers as network 
nodes expand MIO-network abilities to detect illicit material in the maritime domain. 
Moreover, the use of appropriate networking equipment (as the respective used during 
the above mentioned experiments) results, except for the necessary data dissemination 
that can be voice, video, or sensor spectra, to the area coverage by the network 
augmentation. This coverage augmentation is achieved either with a range increases of 
direct communication between two nodes or through the use of communication relay 
nodes such as those used in San Francisco Bay and the riverine experiments. 
Furthermore, the SA tools used during these experiments resulted in better exploitation of 
the employed means, as well as with network control and monitoring. Another outcome 
from these experiments is the fact that a source can be detected and afterwards identified 
and evaluated without the physical presence of experts on the scene. Also, the use of 
UAVs and USVs to approach the source carrier and determine the presence or absence of 
CBRNE material increases the potential of smaller security forces to more efficiently and 
effectively perform these vital security and interdiction missions. In these experiments, 
almost all assets mentioned in Chapter III were used, except for buoys and radar nodes, 
proving that their employment is not only feasible, but necessary and advantageous for 
the evolution of these operations. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The main concept that this thesis examined was the potential contributions of ad-
hoc sensor networks in MIO and regional maritime security operations. By investigating 
network requirements from actual operations in the field, reviewing possible network 
equipment under development,, and results of relevant field experiments on ad-hoc 
sensor networks, the potential was shown for the use of ad-hoc sensor networks to 
improve mission performance during MIO and regional maritime security operations 
evolution and specifically enhance force protection and homeland defense against 
assymetric threats (e.g., CBRNE weapons) was shown.. This improvement is 
accomplished because network-enabled boarding teams can conduct their tasks on a 
suspect vessel by providing their TOC and reachback centers of excellence with real-time 
information (e.g., transmitting video, voice, and advanced sensor data) through the 
network. A multitude of platforms (e.g., warships, security patrol boats, Coast Guard 
Cutters, USVs and UAV, and buoys etc.) can succeed in detecting the presence of 
CBRNE materials being transported aboard surface vessels, and in some cases carried 
onboard aircraft (see experiment TNT/MIO 12–2). With the proper network 
communication systems, data can be disseminate through the network over significant 
distances either directly between two nodes or indirectly through the use of multiple 
nodes and their multi-hop capability. With the employment of all these means, the 
detection and interdiction of a vessel that may carry CBRNE material or WMDs can take 
place a safe distance from shore and friendly forces, minimizing the risks to friendly 
forces, civilians and property. Furthermore, the innovative employment of networked 
swimmers and divers enabled them to share, in real-time, vital information that 
traditionally had no way of moving very far to or from the divers in a short period of 
time. With ad-hoc sensor networking, divers, boarding teams, unattended sensors, 
security forces, and their MIO TOC can coordinate their information and operations 
rapidly—and with the real-time support of centers of excellence (e.g., LLNL and DTRA), 
high-level command and control elements (e.g., emergency operations centers, regional 
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headquarters, and special operations commands), and intelligence centers. Additionally, 
the ad-hoc sensor networks show great promise to expand and enhance coverage and 
adaptability for regional maritime security operations: they can provide for multi-sensor 
inputs to SA tools such as the Google Earth PLI for node-location monitoring. The 
coverage of the ad-hoc sensor network is determined, as discussed in Chapter II, by the 
effective communication range of its node, and their multi-hop capabilities. 
This research showed that a reliable direct communication distance of seven 
nautical miles was achieved between mobile small surface vessels. That distance was 
expandable to fourteen nautical miles with the use of a relay node. Moreover, these 
experiments proved that the higher the antenna gain of the two nodes, the larger the 
throughput and data rate achieved. Consequently, one significant factor on which the 
coverage of an ad-hoc sensor network relies is the equipment used. With the appropriate 
equipment and availability of participating nodes, the network coverage can be increased 
significantly beyond fourteen nautical miles. Conceptually, with the inclusion of WiMAX 
capacities, network connectivity beyond LOS at a distance of approximately twenty-
seven nautical miles is possible. With relays nodes, the area covered by the network can 
be augmented encompass many mobile sensor nodes operating an area with a radius of 
fifty nautical miles. Moreover, using UAV systems, discussed in Chapter III, the network 
can likely achieve data-link communications at distances of 100 nautical miles. However, 
connectivity range, and consequently coverage area, is highly affected by the amount and 
type of disseminated data (e.g., voice, video, etc.) and still has to be examined 
thoroughly, especially in the case of MIO networks where the assets/nodes are moving on 
the sea surface and in the air.  
Another significant outcome regarding the use of ad-hoc networking in MIO, as it 
was presented in the discussed in Chapter IV’s review of experimentation, is the 
achievement of information exchange between assets/nodes operating on-scene and 
remote experts located elsewhere in the world and far away from the MIO. The 
assets/nodes are the boarding teams, the networked swimmers, UAVs etc., that can carry 
sensors and disseminate the collected data through the network and consequently to the 
remote experts who evaluate the situation in near real-time. 
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Concerning the QoS that ad-hoc sensor networks provide to MIO and regional 
security operations, it is shown in the outcomes of the TNT/MIO experiments that data in 
the form of video, voice, text chat or sensor spectra can be disseminated through the 
network to provide other nodes (e.g., the TOC and MOB) with real-time information 
from the operational theater. The bandwidth capabilities in the experiments allowed 
duplex communication among nodes, depending on the nodes’ individual equipment. The 
latency and the packet loss observed during experiments were not eliminated; however, 
most of the time, they did not prevent continuous network connectivity and reliable 
receipt of vital information at key nodes (e.g., TOC and reachback centers). Depending 
on the equipment used and the nature (e.g., number of bytes) of the data to be 
disseminated, ad-hoc sensor networks appear capable of effectively supporting MIO 
communications requirements, and offer flexibility to support moving assets/nodes, 
scalability, and fault tolerance. Moreover, with the appropriate array of nodes, 
connectivity can be maintained even in the case of node failures, resulting in network 
survivability during execution. Furthermore, another factor that increases the 
survivability of the network, and consequently the flow of information, is its own 
versatility: the availability of ways that participating nodes can transmit data. For 
example, during TNT/MIO experiments, the boarding team and swimmers could transmit 
and receive information to and from experts either with video or voice or through text 
chat via the Observer’s Notepad application. When the automatic transmission of sensor 
spectra was not possible, the boarding team or swimmers succeeded in transmission to 
expert centers by uploading the data files in Observer’s Notepad. The survivability of the 
MIO ad-hoc sensor network is also enhanced with VPN utilization, as has been tested in 
TNT/MIO experiments, preventing non-authorized network use and monitoring, and 
potential cyber attacks that could lead to DoS. 
Even though ad-hoc sensor networks can support MIO and regional security 
operations, there are still limitations to their use. The most significant is the energy 
constraints of some assets/nodes. For example, the boarding team or networked 
swimmers have limited power available during their missions. The equipment they carry 
is usually battery powered, so there is the potential, of running out of energy and not 
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being able to share their information through the network. The same constraint may apply 
to UAVs such as the mini-helicopter employed in TNT/MIO experiments with NMIOTC. 
Energy consumption rates also depend on the applications used and the amount of data to 
transmit. Another limitation on ad-hoc sensor networks is the connectivity range. 
Although a direct connectivity range of seven nautical miles was achieved during 
TNT/MIO experiments and is considered more than sufficient for MIO, there remains a 
need for a greater connectivity range that allows a less dense array of nodes to cover data 
flow for a large area. Extended connectivity ranges also enhance network survivability in 
case of node failure. Of course, tradeoff analysis will need to be conducted to balance 
cost of increased connectivity coverage against more lesser-capable relay nodes. Also, 
the limited standoff distance from which a sensor can detect CBRNE material can be 
considered a potential constraint, even though it does not have to do with the network’s 
overall performance, rather just the sensitivity of the detector itself. The throughput of the 
ad-hoc sensor network can also be a potential limitation. Though the throughput achieved 
was highly satisfying, allowing video, voice, and sensor data to be transmitted in high 
fidelity field experiments, the amount and variety of data can be excessively high and 
may not be supported by the bandwidth of the network, since throughput is reduced 
during multi-hop transmission. More experimentation must be conducted to understand 
and overcome these limits.     
B. OTHER APPLICATIONS – POTENTIAL FUTURE RESEARCH 
Apart from MIO and regional security operations, ad-hoc sensor networks are 
able to support naval area surveillance operations. For this application, radar, video, and 
EO/IR systems are required. During the TNT/MIO experiments discussed in this thesis, 
none of these systems—except for cameras—were employed. The use of smart buoys and 
UAVs, except for Vellerofontis, were not examined, though the presence of a vessel may 
be considered a surrogate for a buoy. Assets with the appropriate sensors and 
communications means can be placed in such an array to ensure the surveillance and 
monitoring of a wide area from the sea surface. For example, a potential area that these 
assets/nodes could be deployment in is waters off of the Horn of Africa where the 
detection and interdiction of pirate vessels that threaten safe and free commercial 
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navigation is a high profile mission. Another area where a network consisting of UAVs, 
buoys, vessels with radar, cameras, WMD sensors, and EO/IR devices, in combination 
with satellite surveillance, could be deployed is the Mediterranean Sea to help prevent 
illegal immigration from Africa and Asia to Europe.  
Except for surveillance purposes, ad-hoc sensor networks like those for MIOs can 
enhance the force protection, not only of a naval base, but of a commercial port, by 
detecting suspicious cargo on vessels or floating objects that may pose an imminent 
threat.  
Connectivity-range augmentation, direct and indirect, is one of the factors 
defining the coverage area of the network; the other is the coverage of each individual 
sensor. Together with bandwidth increase, this issue will be the object of much research. 
With technological evolution, these problems are likely to be resolved soon, but the 
tradeoff analyses will remain: as technology evolves, so does the cost of these systems. 
The employment of radar and surveillance systems in ad-hoc sensor networks has to be 
examined thoroughly to provide, in addition to the video and data dissemination 
discussed in this thesis, real-time radar picture through the network to other nodes such as 
TOCs, intelligence centers, and ships operating far away. Creating that kind of wide-area, 
integrated, mostly unattended sensor-provided SA picture to support decision makers’ 
information needs should be a networking goal to provide better fidelity surveillance than 
can only be achieved by costly satellite surveillance or the commitment of a large number 
of manned military or security force assets. This is a rich area for future research. 
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